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      <title>GHSA-jv6m-48w5-5rpr — envd: Host file disclosure through requirements path traversal and TOCTOU</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-jv6m-48w5-5rpr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: envd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;envd’s `install.python_packages(requirements=...)` could read files outside the build context on the host. Content interpreted as dependency entries could appear in build logs and build-step metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f576c92, released in v1.3.5, added path containment validation but left a time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) race between symlink resolution and opening the requirements file. Commit 9d575b3 addresses this race by opening requirements files through a directory-rooted filesystem handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;envd reads requirements files on the host to determine whether their contents can be embedded directly into a pip installation build step.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable host-side requirements read was introduced in v0.3.38. Version v1.3.5 added containment checks for static path escapes but remained vulnerable to a TOCTOU race. The complete fix is included in v1.3.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before f576c92, this host read lacked a build-context containment check. That commit added frontend path validation and a compile-time check using filepath.EvalSymlinks followed by a containment comparison.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, symlink resolution returns a pathname rather than a pinned filesystem object. The subsequent os.Open independently resolves that pathname. Concurrent filesystem changes could therefore invalidate the containment check before the file was opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The complete fix uses os.OpenRoot and Root.Open to enforce containment during filesystem traversal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Resources:
- first commit: be783264fdd79ad7262cea0485b…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: envd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;envd’s `install.python_packages(requirements=...)` could read files outside the build context on the host. Content interpreted as dependency entries could appear in build logs and build-step metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f576c92, released in v1.3.5, added path containment validation but left a time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) race between symlink resolution and opening the requirements file. Commit 9d575b3 addresses this race by opening requirements files through a directory-rooted filesystem handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;envd reads requirements files on the host to determine whether their contents can be embedded directly into a pip installation build step.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable host-side requirements read was introduced in v0.3.38. Version v1.3.5 added containment checks for static path escapes but remained vulnerable to a TOCTOU race. The complete fix is included in v1.3.6.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before f576c92, this host read lacked a build-context containment check. That commit added frontend path validation and a compile-time check using filepath.EvalSymlinks followed by a containment comparison.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, symlink resolution returns a pathname rather than a pinned filesystem object. The subsequent os.Open independently resolves that pathname. Concurrent filesystem changes could therefore invalidate the containment check before the file was opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The complete fix uses os.OpenRoot and Root.Open to enforce containment during filesystem traversal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Resources:
- first commit: be783264fdd79ad7262cea0485b…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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