https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:36:33 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-127916 <p>bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image&#39;s header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow check. Nothing earlier on the validation path bounds the whole span either: bootutil_img_validate() compares the image size against bootutil_max_image_size() only after the hash has been computed.</p> <p>The callers bound part of the span, or none of it:</p> <p>On the swap and overwrite upgrade path, boot_validate_slot() first runs the image header check (boot_is_header_valid(), later boot_check_header_valid()). Before MCUboot 2.2.0 that check covered only ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size, so for every image the protected-TLV area (ih_protect_tlv_size, a uint16_t, up to 65535 bytes) was hashed without being bounded. From 2.2.0 the check includes ih_protect_tlv_size, except for a compressed image in the secondary slot when MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES (CONFIG_BOOT_DECOMPRESSION) is enabled, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. The serial recovery image-list and image-state handlers (bs_list() and bs_set() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c) and Zephyr&#39;s single-slot and firmware loaders (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c, boot/zephyr/firmware_loader.c) call bootutil_img_validate() with no header check at all, so on those paths ih_img_size is unbounded as well.</p> <p>The image is hashed before its signature is che…</p> <p>bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image&#39;s header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow check. Nothing earlier on the validation path bounds the whole span either: bootutil_img_validate() compares the image size against bootutil_max_image_size() only after the hash has been computed.</p> <p>The callers bound part of the span, or none of it:</p> <p>On the swap and overwrite upgrade path, boot_validate_slot() first runs the image header check (boot_is_header_valid(), later boot_check_header_valid()). Before MCUboot 2.2.0 that check covered only ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size, so for every image the protected-TLV area (ih_protect_tlv_size, a uint16_t, up to 65535 bytes) was hashed without being bounded. From 2.2.0 the check includes ih_protect_tlv_size, except for a compressed image in the secondary slot when MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES (CONFIG_BOOT_DECOMPRESSION) is enabled, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. The serial recovery image-list and image-state handlers (bs_list() and bs_set() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c) and Zephyr&#39;s single-slot and firmware loaders (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c, boot/zephyr/firmware_loader.c) call bootutil_img_validate() with no header check at all, so on those paths ih_img_size is unbounded as well.</p> <p>The image is hashed before its signature is che…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-127916