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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:36:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125332</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125332</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, a forge.tls client accepts a ServerHello compression_method that it did not offer. When the client later handles ServerHelloDone, tls.createConnectionState() rejects the unsupported compression algorithm by throwing an Error that propagates from connection.process(). A malicious server or an on-path attacker can alter the unauthenticated ServerHello compression byte before the server Finished message and terminate a Node.js process when the application does not catch the exception. The affected client paths include direct forge.tls use, forge.tls.wrapSocket, and forge.http; forge.tls servers are not affected, and the issue has no confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, a forge.tls client accepts a ServerHello compression_method that it did not offer. When the client later handles ServerHelloDone, tls.createConnectionState() rejects the unsupported compression algorithm by throwing an Error that propagates from connection.process(). A malicious server or an on-path attacker can alter the unauthenticated ServerHello compression byte before the server Finished message and terminate a Node.js process when the application does not catch the exception. The affected client paths include direct forge.tls use, forge.tls.wrapSocket, and forge.http; forge.tls servers are not affected, and the issue has no confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125332</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w4xr-hqv8-ch44 — Forge: TLS client crash on an unsupported ServerHello compression method</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w4xr-hqv8-ch44</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A `forge.tls` client accepts any compression method in the ServerHello, although it only offers no compression. An unknown method makes `connection.process()` throw an uncaught `Error` when the client handles ServerHelloDone, before the server is authenticated. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can use this to terminate a Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The client&amp;#39;s ClientHello offers only the `null` compression method. `tls.parseHelloMessage()` in `lib/tls.js` stores the ServerHello&amp;#39;s `compression_method` for the client without checking it (the code has a `TODO: handle compression methods`). When the client handles ServerHelloDone it calls `tls.createConnectionState()`, which throws `Error(&amp;#39;Unsupported compression algorithm.&amp;#39;)` for any method other than `null` (0) and `deflate` (1). The exception propagates out of `connection.process()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ServerHello isn&amp;#39;t authenticated until the server&amp;#39;s Finished message, so an on-path attacker can change the compression byte of a genuine ServerHello; the certificate chain still verifies. Applications that pass socket data to `process()` without catching exceptions terminate. This includes `forge.tls.wrapSocket`, which calls `process()` from its socket data handler, and `forge.http`, which uses it. A `deflate` (1) method, also never offered, makes the handshake fail later with an error instead of a crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Servers are not affected: a server always selects no compression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix fails the h…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A `forge.tls` client accepts any compression method in the ServerHello, although it only offers no compression. An unknown method makes `connection.process()` throw an uncaught `Error` when the client handles ServerHelloDone, before the server is authenticated. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can use this to terminate a Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The client&amp;#39;s ClientHello offers only the `null` compression method. `tls.parseHelloMessage()` in `lib/tls.js` stores the ServerHello&amp;#39;s `compression_method` for the client without checking it (the code has a `TODO: handle compression methods`). When the client handles ServerHelloDone it calls `tls.createConnectionState()`, which throws `Error(&amp;#39;Unsupported compression algorithm.&amp;#39;)` for any method other than `null` (0) and `deflate` (1). The exception propagates out of `connection.process()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ServerHello isn&amp;#39;t authenticated until the server&amp;#39;s Finished message, so an on-path attacker can change the compression byte of a genuine ServerHello; the certificate chain still verifies. Applications that pass socket data to `process()` without catching exceptions terminate. This includes `forge.tls.wrapSocket`, which calls `process()` from its socket data handler, and `forge.http`, which uses it. A `deflate` (1) method, also never offered, makes the handshake fail later with an error instead of a crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Servers are not affected: a server always selects no compression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix fails the h…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w4xr-hqv8-ch44</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-125332 — Forge: TLS client crash on an unsupported ServerHello compression method</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-125332</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-125332</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-125332</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125332</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-125332</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-node-forge, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, a forge.tls client accepts a ServerHello compression_method that it did not offer. When the client later handles ServerHelloDone, tls.createConnectionState() rejects the unsupported compression algorithm by throwing an Error that propagates from connection.process(). A malicious server or an on-path attacker can alter the unauthenticated ServerHello compression byte before the server Finished message and terminate a Node.js process when the application does not catch the exception. The affected client paths include direct forge.tls use, forge.tls.wrapSocket, and forge.http; forge.tls servers are not affected, and the issue has no confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-node-forge, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, a forge.tls client accepts a ServerHello compression_method that it did not offer. When the client later handles ServerHelloDone, tls.createConnectionState() rejects the unsupported compression algorithm by throwing an Error that propagates from connection.process(). A malicious server or an on-path attacker can alter the unauthenticated ServerHello compression byte before the server Finished message and terminate a Node.js process when the application does not catch the exception. The affected client paths include direct forge.tls use, forge.tls.wrapSocket, and forge.http; forge.tls servers are not affected, and the issue has no confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-125332</guid>
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