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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 17:49:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125115</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125115</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125115</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq — @novu/application-generic: `validateUrlSsrf` permits CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) destinations — affects Workflow HTTP request…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vg6v-j97m-h5xq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @novu/application-generic&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hi Novu team,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reporting an SSRF blocklist gap in the shared `validateUrlSsrf` guard. A complete self-contained reproduction is inlined below — copy the four files into a directory and run `docker compose up`, plus a single-file probe that runs against Node directly. Locally validated against HEAD `291817c`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Novu&amp;#39;s shared SSRF guard `validateUrlSsrf(url)` is used before server-side requests to user-configured URLs. The guard resolves hostnames and blocks a regex list of private/reserved IP ranges, but it does not block `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space. As a result, Novu features protected by this guard can still send server-side requests to destinations such as `100.100.100.200` (Alibaba Cloud metadata service) and any other service reachable in `100.64.0.0/10`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts`
  - `isPrivateIp(...)` regex list at lines 9-28
  - DNS resolution and address validation at lines 55-72&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Product call-sites:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Workflow HTTP request step: `apps/worker/src/app/workflow/usecases/send-message/execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(url)` at line 149, then uses `HttpClientService` to send the request.
- Webhook filter condition: `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl)` at line 265, then sends `axios.post(child.webhookUrl, ...)` at line 277.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTP client:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `libs/application-generic/src…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @novu/application-generic&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hi Novu team,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reporting an SSRF blocklist gap in the shared `validateUrlSsrf` guard. A complete self-contained reproduction is inlined below — copy the four files into a directory and run `docker compose up`, plus a single-file probe that runs against Node directly. Locally validated against HEAD `291817c`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Novu&amp;#39;s shared SSRF guard `validateUrlSsrf(url)` is used before server-side requests to user-configured URLs. The guard resolves hostnames and blocks a regex list of private/reserved IP ranges, but it does not block `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space. As a result, Novu features protected by this guard can still send server-side requests to destinations such as `100.100.100.200` (Alibaba Cloud metadata service) and any other service reachable in `100.64.0.0/10`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts`
  - `isPrivateIp(...)` regex list at lines 9-28
  - DNS resolution and address validation at lines 55-72&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Product call-sites:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Workflow HTTP request step: `apps/worker/src/app/workflow/usecases/send-message/execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(url)` at line 149, then uses `HttpClientService` to send the request.
- Webhook filter condition: `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl)` at line 265, then sends `axios.post(child.webhookUrl, ...)` at line 277.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTP client:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `libs/application-generic/src…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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