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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 01:35:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-123807</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123807</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. From 2.0.0 until 2.34.0 for Signal K Server and from 1.0.0 until 1.5.3 for @signalk/resources-provider, the v2 REST route GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId accepts an unsafe resourceId that can escape the intended resource directory. The route passes the attacker-controlled resourceId through src/api/resources/index.ts to FileStore.getResource() in packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts without adequate path containment, allowing arbitrary JSON files reachable by the server to be read. Related PUT and DELETE resource operations can write or delete files outside the storage root. Deployments with allow_readonly enabled permit anonymous reads, while other deployments require a readonly user token. Reading security.json exposes the HS256 JWT signing secret and password hashes, allowing an attacker to forge an administrator token. Administrative access to POST /skServer/providers can then create an Execute provider that runs commands with the server process privileges and persists its configuration across restarts. This issue is fixed in Signal K Server 2.34.0 and @signalk/resources-provider 1.5.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. From 2.0.0 until 2.34.0 for Signal K Server and from 1.0.0 until 1.5.3 for @signalk/resources-provider, the v2 REST route GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId accepts an unsafe resourceId that can escape the intended resource directory. The route passes the attacker-controlled resourceId through src/api/resources/index.ts to FileStore.getResource() in packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts without adequate path containment, allowing arbitrary JSON files reachable by the server to be read. Related PUT and DELETE resource operations can write or delete files outside the storage root. Deployments with allow_readonly enabled permit anonymous reads, while other deployments require a readonly user token. Reading security.json exposes the HS256 JWT signing secret and password hashes, allowing an attacker to forge an administrator token. Administrative access to POST /skServer/providers can then create an Execute provider that runs commands with the server process privileges and persists its configuration across restarts. This issue is fixed in Signal K Server 2.34.0 and @signalk/resources-provider 1.5.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123807</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2 — Signal K resources API path traversal can disclose the JWT signing secret and enable remote code execution</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: signalk-server, npm: @signalk/resources-provider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Path traversal in the Signal K resources and applicationData APIs lets an
unauthenticated or low-privileged user read, write and delete files outside
the storage root. Reading &amp;lt;config&amp;gt;/security.json discloses the JWT signing
secret, enabling admin token forgery and remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The v2 REST resources API `GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId` passes `resourceId` to `FileStore.getResource()` without validation. `getResource()` builds the file path with `path.join(this.resources[type].path, itemUuid)` followed by `readFile` + `JSON.parse`, so a `%2F`-encoded multi-level traversal (`..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F`) escapes the resource storage directory and returns any JSON file on the server (source: `src/api/resources/index.ts:559-600`, `packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts:115-125`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the JWT signing secret is stored in plaintext in `&amp;lt;config&amp;gt;/security.json` (generated at `src/tokensecurity.ts:271`, persisted via `saveSecurityConfig` at `src/security.ts:377`), an unauthenticated attacker on deployments with `allow_readonly=true` (a supported, UI-toggleable configuration granting anonymous read access) can:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Read `&amp;lt;config&amp;gt;/security.json`** — disclosing the JWT signing secret (512-hex) and user password hashes.
2. **Forge an admin JWT** — HS256-sign `{&amp;#34;id&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;admin&amp;#34;}` with the disclosed secret; accepted by `/skServer/loginStatus` (`userLevel: &amp;#34;admin&amp;#34;`) and all admin-protected endpoints (`a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: signalk-server, npm: @signalk/resources-provider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Path traversal in the Signal K resources and applicationData APIs lets an
unauthenticated or low-privileged user read, write and delete files outside
the storage root. Reading &amp;lt;config&amp;gt;/security.json discloses the JWT signing
secret, enabling admin token forgery and remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The v2 REST resources API `GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId` passes `resourceId` to `FileStore.getResource()` without validation. `getResource()` builds the file path with `path.join(this.resources[type].path, itemUuid)` followed by `readFile` + `JSON.parse`, so a `%2F`-encoded multi-level traversal (`..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F`) escapes the resource storage directory and returns any JSON file on the server (source: `src/api/resources/index.ts:559-600`, `packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts:115-125`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the JWT signing secret is stored in plaintext in `&amp;lt;config&amp;gt;/security.json` (generated at `src/tokensecurity.ts:271`, persisted via `saveSecurityConfig` at `src/security.ts:377`), an unauthenticated attacker on deployments with `allow_readonly=true` (a supported, UI-toggleable configuration granting anonymous read access) can:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Read `&amp;lt;config&amp;gt;/security.json`** — disclosing the JWT signing secret (512-hex) and user password hashes.
2. **Forge an admin JWT** — HS256-sign `{&amp;#34;id&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;admin&amp;#34;}` with the disclosed secret; accepted by `/skServer/loginStatus` (`userLevel: &amp;#34;admin&amp;#34;`) and all admin-protected endpoints (`a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2</guid>
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