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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 18:44:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-acronym-CVE-2026-63310 — NLTK: Missing Post-Download Integrity Verification Allows Malicious Package Injection</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-63310</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: acronym&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK&amp;#39;s package downloader in nltk/downloader.py does not verify file integrity after download and before extraction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The download flow at lines 789-825:
1. File is downloaded to a temp path via HTTP
2. os.replace(tmp_filepath, filepath) moves it to the final location (line 799)
3. Extraction begins via _unzip_iter() (line 825)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between steps 2 and 3, there is no SHA-256 verification. The checksum logic exists in _pkg_status() (lines 982-1015) but it is only used BEFORE download as a status check (&amp;#34;is this package already installed and up-to-date?&amp;#34;). It is never called after download to verify the file that was actually received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attack vectors:
1. MITM during HTTP download (NLTK downloads from http:// by default on some mirrors)
2. Race condition on shared filesystems (attacker replaces file between os.replace and _unzip_iter)
3. DNS poisoning redirecting to attacker-controlled server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PoC:
```python
import nltk
import unittest.mock
import zipfile
import io
import os&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Create a malicious zip that will be &amp;#34;downloaded&amp;#34;
malicious_zip = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(malicious_zip, &amp;#39;w&amp;#39;) as zf:
    zf.writestr(&amp;#39;punkt_tab/tokenizers/punkt_tab/english.pickle&amp;#39;, 
                b&amp;#39;MALICIOUS PAYLOAD - attacker controlled content&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Patch urllib to return our malicious zip
with unittest.mock.patch(&amp;#39;urllib.request.urlopen&amp;#39;) as mock_urlopen:
    mock_response = unittest.mock.MagicMock()
    mock_response.read.return_value = malicious_zip.getvalue()
    mock_response.headers = {&amp;#39;C…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: acronym&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK&amp;#39;s package downloader in nltk/downloader.py does not verify file integrity after download and before extraction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The download flow at lines 789-825:
1. File is downloaded to a temp path via HTTP
2. os.replace(tmp_filepath, filepath) moves it to the final location (line 799)
3. Extraction begins via _unzip_iter() (line 825)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between steps 2 and 3, there is no SHA-256 verification. The checksum logic exists in _pkg_status() (lines 982-1015) but it is only used BEFORE download as a status check (&amp;#34;is this package already installed and up-to-date?&amp;#34;). It is never called after download to verify the file that was actually received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attack vectors:
1. MITM during HTTP download (NLTK downloads from http:// by default on some mirrors)
2. Race condition on shared filesystems (attacker replaces file between os.replace and _unzip_iter)
3. DNS poisoning redirecting to attacker-controlled server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PoC:
```python
import nltk
import unittest.mock
import zipfile
import io
import os&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Create a malicious zip that will be &amp;#34;downloaded&amp;#34;
malicious_zip = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(malicious_zip, &amp;#39;w&amp;#39;) as zf:
    zf.writestr(&amp;#39;punkt_tab/tokenizers/punkt_tab/english.pickle&amp;#39;, 
                b&amp;#39;MALICIOUS PAYLOAD - attacker controlled content&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Patch urllib to return our malicious zip
with unittest.mock.patch(&amp;#39;urllib.request.urlopen&amp;#39;) as mock_urlopen:
    mock_response = unittest.mock.MagicMock()
    mock_response.read.return_value = malicious_zip.getvalue()
    mock_response.headers = {&amp;#39;C…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-63310</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-12259</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-12259</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In nltk version 3.9.4, the `nltk.downloader.Downloader._download_package()` function writes downloaded package bytes to disk and may extract them before enforcing SHA-256 or MD5 checksum validation. This allows an attacker to tamper with the package response body for `info.url` through a compromised mirror, malicious proxy, or other source-substitution condition, leading to the installation of attacker-controlled package bytes. The vulnerability can result in malicious corpus or model content being trusted by downstream users or applications.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In nltk version 3.9.4, the `nltk.downloader.Downloader._download_package()` function writes downloaded package bytes to disk and may extract them before enforcing SHA-256 or MD5 checksum validation. This allows an attacker to tamper with the package response body for `info.url` through a compromised mirror, malicious proxy, or other source-substitution condition, leading to the installation of attacker-controlled package bytes. The vulnerability can result in malicious corpus or model content being trusted by downstream users or applications.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-12259</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5wp5-5229-5g6q — NLTK: Missing Post-Download Integrity Verification Allows Malicious Package Injection</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5wp5-5229-5g6q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK&amp;#39;s package downloader in nltk/downloader.py does not verify file integrity after download and before extraction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The download flow at lines 789-825:
1. File is downloaded to a temp path via HTTP
2. os.replace(tmp_filepath, filepath) moves it to the final location (line 799)
3. Extraction begins via _unzip_iter() (line 825)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between steps 2 and 3, there is no SHA-256 verification. The checksum logic exists in _pkg_status() (lines 982-1015) but it is only used BEFORE download as a status check (&amp;#34;is this package already installed and up-to-date?&amp;#34;). It is never called after download to verify the file that was actually received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attack vectors:
1. MITM during HTTP download (NLTK downloads from http:// by default on some mirrors)
2. Race condition on shared filesystems (attacker replaces file between os.replace and _unzip_iter)
3. DNS poisoning redirecting to attacker-controlled server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PoC:
```python
import nltk
import unittest.mock
import zipfile
import io
import os&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Create a malicious zip that will be &amp;#34;downloaded&amp;#34;
malicious_zip = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(malicious_zip, &amp;#39;w&amp;#39;) as zf:
    zf.writestr(&amp;#39;punkt_tab/tokenizers/punkt_tab/english.pickle&amp;#39;, 
                b&amp;#39;MALICIOUS PAYLOAD - attacker controlled content&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Patch urllib to return our malicious zip
with unittest.mock.patch(&amp;#39;urllib.request.urlopen&amp;#39;) as mock_urlopen:
    mock_response = unittest.mock.MagicMock()
    mock_response.read.return_value = malicious_zip.getvalue()
    mock_response.headers = {&amp;#39;C…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK&amp;#39;s package downloader in nltk/downloader.py does not verify file integrity after download and before extraction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The download flow at lines 789-825:
1. File is downloaded to a temp path via HTTP
2. os.replace(tmp_filepath, filepath) moves it to the final location (line 799)
3. Extraction begins via _unzip_iter() (line 825)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between steps 2 and 3, there is no SHA-256 verification. The checksum logic exists in _pkg_status() (lines 982-1015) but it is only used BEFORE download as a status check (&amp;#34;is this package already installed and up-to-date?&amp;#34;). It is never called after download to verify the file that was actually received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attack vectors:
1. MITM during HTTP download (NLTK downloads from http:// by default on some mirrors)
2. Race condition on shared filesystems (attacker replaces file between os.replace and _unzip_iter)
3. DNS poisoning redirecting to attacker-controlled server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PoC:
```python
import nltk
import unittest.mock
import zipfile
import io
import os&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Create a malicious zip that will be &amp;#34;downloaded&amp;#34;
malicious_zip = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(malicious_zip, &amp;#39;w&amp;#39;) as zf:
    zf.writestr(&amp;#39;punkt_tab/tokenizers/punkt_tab/english.pickle&amp;#39;, 
                b&amp;#39;MALICIOUS PAYLOAD - attacker controlled content&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Patch urllib to return our malicious zip
with unittest.mock.patch(&amp;#39;urllib.request.urlopen&amp;#39;) as mock_urlopen:
    mock_response = unittest.mock.MagicMock()
    mock_response.read.return_value = malicious_zip.getvalue()
    mock_response.headers = {&amp;#39;C…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5wp5-5229-5g6q</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-12259</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-12259</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In nltk version 3.9.4, the `nltk.downloader.Downloader._download_package()` function writes downloaded package bytes to disk and may extract them before enforcing SHA-256 or MD5 checksum validation. This allows an attacker to tamper with the package response body for `info.url` through a compromised mirror, malicious proxy, or other source-substitution condition, leading to the installation of attacker-controlled package bytes. The vulnerability can result in malicious corpus or model content being trusted by downstream users or applications.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In nltk version 3.9.4, the `nltk.downloader.Downloader._download_package()` function writes downloaded package bytes to disk and may extract them before enforcing SHA-256 or MD5 checksum validation. This allows an attacker to tamper with the package response body for `info.url` through a compromised mirror, malicious proxy, or other source-substitution condition, leading to the installation of attacker-controlled package bytes. The vulnerability can result in malicious corpus or model content being trusted by downstream users or applications.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-12259</guid>
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