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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-119215</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119215</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows a user with an account to install a TOTP secret they control on another user&amp;#39;s account, and then sign in as that user or hold their second factor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange verified a setup token but did not check that it was issued to the record being confirmed, so an attacker&amp;#39;s own pending secret could be confirmed onto another user&amp;#39;s record. The TOTP setup changes, ConfirmSetupChange, GeneratePendingSetupChange and GenerateSecretChange, also marked their changesets as AshAuthentication interactions, which the standard AshAuthenticationInteraction policy bypass lets through. A policy limiting setup and confirm_setup to the actor&amp;#39;s own record therefore never ran when an application exposed those actions by record key, and a direct setup call on another user&amp;#39;s record returned that user&amp;#39;s pending secret and setup token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.16.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows a user with an account to install a TOTP secret they control on another user&amp;#39;s account, and then sign in as that user or hold their second factor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange verified a setup token but did not check that it was issued to the record being confirmed, so an attacker&amp;#39;s own pending secret could be confirmed onto another user&amp;#39;s record. The TOTP setup changes, ConfirmSetupChange, GeneratePendingSetupChange and GenerateSecretChange, also marked their changesets as AshAuthentication interactions, which the standard AshAuthenticationInteraction policy bypass lets through. A policy limiting setup and confirm_setup to the actor&amp;#39;s own record therefore never ran when an application exposed those actions by record key, and a direct setup call on another user&amp;#39;s record returned that user&amp;#39;s pending secret and setup token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.16.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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