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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-118266</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118266</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Echo&amp;#39;s MethodOverride middleware accepts a safe HTTP method as the override target for a POST request. When MethodOverride is registered before CSRF in the post-routing middleware chain, route selection retains the original state-changing POST handler but the override changes the method before CSRF evaluates it, causing both token validation and Sec-Fetch-Site checks to be skipped. A cross-site exploit requires an authenticated victim and an override value that a browser-submitted request can control, such as the form getter used by the advisory reproducer; the default X-HTTP-Method-Override header getter is not settable by a cross-site form. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Echo&amp;#39;s MethodOverride middleware accepts a safe HTTP method as the override target for a POST request. When MethodOverride is registered before CSRF in the post-routing middleware chain, route selection retains the original state-changing POST handler but the override changes the method before CSRF evaluates it, causing both token validation and Sec-Fetch-Site checks to be skipped. A cross-site exploit requires an authenticated victim and an override value that a browser-submitted request can control, such as the form getter used by the advisory reproducer; the default X-HTTP-Method-Override header getter is not settable by a cross-site form. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118266</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r7w9-592q-9vg4 — Echo has CSRF Protection Bypass via MethodOverride Rewriting POST to Safe Method</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-r7w9-592q-9vg4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/labstack/echo/v5, Go: github.com/labstack/echo/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `MethodOverride` middleware accepts any non-empty string as the override target method — including safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE) — when rewriting a POST request. When `MethodOverride` is registered before `CSRF` in the post-routing middleware chain (`e.Use()`), it rewrites the request method to a safe method before `CSRF` evaluates it. The CSRF middleware then skips token validation for the now-safe method, allowing state-changing POST handlers to execute without any CSRF check. Both the legacy token path and the modern `Sec-Fetch-Site` protection path are bypassed simultaneously.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `middleware/method_override.go` — `MethodOverrideConfig.ToMiddleware()` (lines 55–71): no whitelist on the override target method
- `middleware/csrf.go` — `CSRFConfig.ToMiddleware()` (lines 188–189): safe-method bypass branch reads the already-rewritten method
- `middleware/csrf.go` — `checkSecFetchSiteRequest()` (line 283): `Sec-Fetch-Site` safe check also reads the rewritten method&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### MethodOverride accepts safe methods as override targets&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`MethodOverrideConfig.ToMiddleware()` (`method_override.go:55-71`) restricts the **source** method (only POST requests are overrideable) but applies no whitelist to the **target**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// method_override.go:61-67
req := c.Request()
if req.Method == http.MethodPost {
    m := config.Getter(c)
    if m != &amp;#34;&amp;#34; {
        req.Method = m   // ← any non-empty string accepted, including &amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/labstack/echo/v5, Go: github.com/labstack/echo/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `MethodOverride` middleware accepts any non-empty string as the override target method — including safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE) — when rewriting a POST request. When `MethodOverride` is registered before `CSRF` in the post-routing middleware chain (`e.Use()`), it rewrites the request method to a safe method before `CSRF` evaluates it. The CSRF middleware then skips token validation for the now-safe method, allowing state-changing POST handlers to execute without any CSRF check. Both the legacy token path and the modern `Sec-Fetch-Site` protection path are bypassed simultaneously.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `middleware/method_override.go` — `MethodOverrideConfig.ToMiddleware()` (lines 55–71): no whitelist on the override target method
- `middleware/csrf.go` — `CSRFConfig.ToMiddleware()` (lines 188–189): safe-method bypass branch reads the already-rewritten method
- `middleware/csrf.go` — `checkSecFetchSiteRequest()` (line 283): `Sec-Fetch-Site` safe check also reads the rewritten method&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### MethodOverride accepts safe methods as override targets&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`MethodOverrideConfig.ToMiddleware()` (`method_override.go:55-71`) restricts the **source** method (only POST requests are overrideable) but applies no whitelist to the **target**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// method_override.go:61-67
req := c.Request()
if req.Method == http.MethodPost {
    m := config.Getter(c)
    if m != &amp;#34;&amp;#34; {
        req.Method = m   // ← any non-empty string accepted, including &amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-r7w9-592q-9vg4</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118266</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-118266</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.10: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Echo&amp;#39;s MethodOverride middleware accepts a safe HTTP method as the override target for a POST request. When MethodOverride is registered before CSRF in the post-routing middleware chain, route selection retains the original state-changing POST handler but the override changes the method before CSRF evaluates it, causing both token validation and Sec-Fetch-Site checks to be skipped. A cross-site exploit requires an authenticated victim and an override value that a browser-submitted request can control, such as the form getter used by the advisory reproducer; the default X-HTTP-Method-Override header getter is not settable by a cross-site form. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.10: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Echo&amp;#39;s MethodOverride middleware accepts a safe HTTP method as the override target for a POST request. When MethodOverride is registered before CSRF in the post-routing middleware chain, route selection retains the original state-changing POST handler but the override changes the method before CSRF evaluates it, causing both token validation and Sec-Fetch-Site checks to be skipped. A cross-site exploit requires an authenticated victim and an override value that a browser-submitted request can control, such as the form getter used by the advisory reproducer; the default X-HTTP-Method-Override header getter is not settable by a cross-site form. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-118266</guid>
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