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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 20:42:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-118265</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118265</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5&amp;#39;s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5&amp;#39;s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118265</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg — Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h53f-rm2w-w7rg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/labstack/echo/v5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Echo v5, `ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader` checked whether the address supplied in `X-Real-IP` belonged to a trusted range instead of checking the address of the direct network peer. An untrusted client could therefore supply a loopback or private address and have it returned by `c.RealIP()` with the extractor&amp;#39;s default trust options.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications using this extractor for IP allowlists, IP-based rate limiting, audit logs or forwarding headers could accept a spoofed client identity. Exploitation requires that the attacker can reach Echo directly or that an intervening proxy passes through the attacker&amp;#39;s `X-Real-IP` value. Applications using the default direct IP extractor are unaffected. Echo v4 is unaffected by this v5 regression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions and patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All v5 releases from v5.0.0 through v5.4.0 are affected. Upgrade to [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The patch validates the direct peer before accepting a syntactically valid `X-Real-IP` value, restoring the v4 trust model. [Fix commit](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use `ExtractIPDirect` until upgrading, or ensure that only trusted proxies can reach Echo and that they replace client-supplied forwarding headers. Configure trusted proxy ranges narrowly for the deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported and patched by @rm-Umar. @Duodum independently reported the same issue in GHSA-c3r7-8j36-7mx8, which is tracked as a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/labstack/echo/v5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Echo v5, `ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader` checked whether the address supplied in `X-Real-IP` belonged to a trusted range instead of checking the address of the direct network peer. An untrusted client could therefore supply a loopback or private address and have it returned by `c.RealIP()` with the extractor&amp;#39;s default trust options.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications using this extractor for IP allowlists, IP-based rate limiting, audit logs or forwarding headers could accept a spoofed client identity. Exploitation requires that the attacker can reach Echo directly or that an intervening proxy passes through the attacker&amp;#39;s `X-Real-IP` value. Applications using the default direct IP extractor are unaffected. Echo v4 is unaffected by this v5 regression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions and patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All v5 releases from v5.0.0 through v5.4.0 are affected. Upgrade to [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The patch validates the direct peer before accepting a syntactically valid `X-Real-IP` value, restoring the v4 trust model. [Fix commit](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use `ExtractIPDirect` until upgrading, or ensure that only trusted proxies can reach Echo and that they replace client-supplied forwarding headers. Configure trusted proxy ranges narrowly for the deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported and patched by @rm-Umar. @Duodum independently reported the same issue in GHSA-c3r7-8j36-7mx8, which is tracked as a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h53f-rm2w-w7rg</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118265</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-118265</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.10: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5&amp;#39;s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo.v3, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.10: golang-github-labstack-echo, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: golang-github-labstack-echo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5&amp;#39;s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-118265</guid>
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