https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 29 Oct 2026 17:51:41 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-116676 <p>Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, &#34; &#34;) and executed through sh -c. An authenticated contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the Atlantis service account without custom workflows, apply permission, or a malicious Terraform provider. External contributors can reach the flaw through fork pull requests only when --allow-fork-prs is enabled, while eligible same-repository branches do not require that option. The commands inherit the Atlantis process environment and can access cloud-provider, Terraform, and version-control credentials as well as files, state, and network resources available to the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.1.</p> <p>Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, &#34; &#34;) and executed through sh -c. An authenticated contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the Atlantis service account without custom workflows, apply permission, or a malicious Terraform provider. External contributors can reach the flaw through fork pull requests only when --allow-fork-prs is enabled, while eligible same-repository branches do not require that option. The commands inherit the Atlantis process environment and can access cloud-provider, Terraform, and version-control credentials as well as files, state, and network resources available to the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.1.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-116676 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/runatlantis/atlantis</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Atlantis passes the Terraform `workspace` value from a pull request&#39;s `atlantis.yaml` into a shell command without quoting or escaping it.</p> <p>A contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name and execute arbitrary commands as the Atlantis service account. This does not require custom workflows, `allow_custom_workflows`, or permission to run `terraform apply`.</p> <p>The executed command inherits the Atlantis process environment, which commonly contains cloud-provider, Terraform, and VCS credentials.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Verified against current `upstream/main` commit `92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984` on August 13, 2026.</p> <p>The vulnerable data flow is:</p> <p>1. The PR-controlled project workspace is validated in [`server/core/config/raw/project.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/config/raw/project.go#L139-L149).</p> <p>Validation rejects only `..`, `/`, and `\`. Shell metacharacters such as `;`, `#`, `$`, redirections, and whitespace remain permitted.</p> <p>2. The workspace is passed directly as a Terraform command argument in [`server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go#L86-L96):</p> <p>```go []string{workspaceCmd, &#34;select&#34;, ctx.Workspace} ```</p> <p>3. Terraform arguments are concatenated into a si…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/runatlantis/atlantis</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Atlantis passes the Terraform `workspace` value from a pull request&#39;s `atlantis.yaml` into a shell command without quoting or escaping it.</p> <p>A contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name and execute arbitrary commands as the Atlantis service account. This does not require custom workflows, `allow_custom_workflows`, or permission to run `terraform apply`.</p> <p>The executed command inherits the Atlantis process environment, which commonly contains cloud-provider, Terraform, and VCS credentials.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Verified against current `upstream/main` commit `92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984` on August 13, 2026.</p> <p>The vulnerable data flow is:</p> <p>1. The PR-controlled project workspace is validated in [`server/core/config/raw/project.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/config/raw/project.go#L139-L149).</p> <p>Validation rejects only `..`, `/`, and `\`. Shell metacharacters such as `;`, `#`, `$`, redirections, and whitespace remain permitted.</p> <p>2. The workspace is passed directly as a Terraform command argument in [`server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go#L86-L96):</p> <p>```go []string{workspaceCmd, &#34;select&#34;, ctx.Workspace} ```</p> <p>3. Terraform arguments are concatenated into a si…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj