https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 21 Oct 2026 07:31:39 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-113661 <p>ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system, and sanitize-html provides a simple HTML sanitizer with a clear API. Prior to sanitize-html 2.18.0, a non-default configuration that allows meta refresh elements and their http-equiv and content attributes can retain unsafe script or redirect destinations embedded in the refresh content value. This issue is fixed in sanitize-html 2.18.0.</p> <p>ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system, and sanitize-html provides a simple HTML sanitizer with a clear API. Prior to sanitize-html 2.18.0, a non-default configuration that allows meta refresh elements and their http-equiv and content attributes can retain unsafe script or redirect destinations embedded in the refresh content value. This issue is fixed in sanitize-html 2.18.0.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-113661 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cv27-6wvh-8x7j <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sanitize-html</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>CVE-2026-53606 expanded `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` so named URL attributes (`action`, `formaction`, `data`, `poster`, `background`, later `ping`, `xlink:href`, …) go through `naughtyHref()`. A **URL nested inside `meta` `content`** (`http-equiv=refresh`) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked.</p> <p>Default `allowedTags` still omit `meta`. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow `meta` plus `http-equiv` / `content`.</p> <p>On **2.17.7**:</p> <p>```text sanitizeHtml( &#39;&lt;meta http-equiv=&#34;refresh&#34; content=&#34;0;url=javascript:alert(1)&#34;&gt;&#39;, { allowedTags: [&#39;meta&#39;], allowedAttributes: { meta: [&#39;http-equiv&#39;, &#39;content&#39;] } } ) // =&gt; &lt;meta http-equiv=&#34;refresh&#34; content=&#34;0;url=javascript:alert(1)&#34; /&gt; ```</p> <p>`data:text/html,…` and arbitrary `https:` destinations also survive. `formaction=&#34;javascript:…&#34;` (53606) is stripped.</p> <p>Please **Request CVE**. Credit: Finder + Reporter (`adrbogacz`).</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`naughtyHref()` only runs when the attribute name is in `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` (`index.js` ~385). Refresh URLs live in a `content` value of the form `0;url=…`, so the gate never fires. Adding `content` to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta `content` (description, viewport).</p> <p>**Fix:** when `http-equiv` is `refresh` (case-insensitive), parse the `; url=` destination and run `naughtyHref(&#39;meta&#39;, url)`. Drop `content` (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other `meta` `content` values alone.</p> <p>### PoC…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sanitize-html</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>CVE-2026-53606 expanded `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` so named URL attributes (`action`, `formaction`, `data`, `poster`, `background`, later `ping`, `xlink:href`, …) go through `naughtyHref()`. A **URL nested inside `meta` `content`** (`http-equiv=refresh`) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked.</p> <p>Default `allowedTags` still omit `meta`. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow `meta` plus `http-equiv` / `content`.</p> <p>On **2.17.7**:</p> <p>```text sanitizeHtml( &#39;&lt;meta http-equiv=&#34;refresh&#34; content=&#34;0;url=javascript:alert(1)&#34;&gt;&#39;, { allowedTags: [&#39;meta&#39;], allowedAttributes: { meta: [&#39;http-equiv&#39;, &#39;content&#39;] } } ) // =&gt; &lt;meta http-equiv=&#34;refresh&#34; content=&#34;0;url=javascript:alert(1)&#34; /&gt; ```</p> <p>`data:text/html,…` and arbitrary `https:` destinations also survive. `formaction=&#34;javascript:…&#34;` (53606) is stripped.</p> <p>Please **Request CVE**. Credit: Finder + Reporter (`adrbogacz`).</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`naughtyHref()` only runs when the attribute name is in `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` (`index.js` ~385). Refresh URLs live in a `content` value of the form `0;url=…`, so the gate never fires. Adding `content` to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta `content` (description, viewport).</p> <p>**Fix:** when `http-equiv` is `refresh` (case-insensitive), parse the `; url=` destination and run `naughtyHref(&#39;meta&#39;, url)`. Drop `content` (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other `meta` `content` values alone.</p> <p>### PoC…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cv27-6wvh-8x7j