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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-113652</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-113652</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. From 1.25.0 until 1.28.0, uploadfs Azure backend leaks account-level SAS token into every public attachment URL. When uploadfs is configured with the Azure backend and sas: true, createContainer() builds the BlobServiceClient from a URL that embeds the full SAS query string, and Azure SDK v12 derived clients inherit that query string. This issue is fixed in version 1.28.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. From 1.25.0 until 1.28.0, uploadfs Azure backend leaks account-level SAS token into every public attachment URL. When uploadfs is configured with the Azure backend and sas: true, createContainer() builds the BlobServiceClient from a URL that embeds the full SAS query string, and Azure SDK v12 derived clients inherit that query string. This issue is fixed in version 1.28.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-113652</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-hhph-8536-gfq5 — ApostropheCMS uploadfs Azure backend leaks account-level SAS token into every public attachment URL (sas: true)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hhph-8536-gfq5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: uploadfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When uploadfs is configured with the Azure backend and `sas: true` (a supported configuration introduced in uploadfs 1.25.0), `createContainer()` builds the `BlobServiceClient` from a URL that embeds the full SAS query string, and Azure SDK v12 derived clients inherit that query string. As a result, `getUrl()` returns a base URL carrying the complete account/container SAS signature (`?sv=...&amp;amp;sig=...`), and Apostrophe&amp;#39;s `attachment.url()` prepends it to every public attachment link — broadcasting a container-level SAS credential (commonly `sp=rwdlac`, full read/write/delete/list) to every site visitor, including anonymous ones. Anyone who can see an attachment URL can read, overwrite, delete, and list every blob in the container for the SAS lifetime. A companion functional bug (blob path appended after the query string, producing broken URLs) shows this code path was never exercised end to end. Shared-key mode (default) and non-Azure backends are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified at commit `5a3746aaed49761e171c2cbfe793267c959829fd` (uploadfs 1.27.0 in the apostrophe monorepo).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause: a credential-bearing client URL is reused as the public base URL. The chain:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Credential-embedded client: [azure.js#L123-L125](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/5a3746aaed49761e171c2cbfe793267c959829fd/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/azure.js#L123-L125) — `new BlobServiceClient(&amp;#34;https://&amp;lt;account&amp;gt;.blob.core.windows.net?&amp;lt;SAS query string&amp;gt;&amp;#34;)` where `cluster.key` is…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: uploadfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When uploadfs is configured with the Azure backend and `sas: true` (a supported configuration introduced in uploadfs 1.25.0), `createContainer()` builds the `BlobServiceClient` from a URL that embeds the full SAS query string, and Azure SDK v12 derived clients inherit that query string. As a result, `getUrl()` returns a base URL carrying the complete account/container SAS signature (`?sv=...&amp;amp;sig=...`), and Apostrophe&amp;#39;s `attachment.url()` prepends it to every public attachment link — broadcasting a container-level SAS credential (commonly `sp=rwdlac`, full read/write/delete/list) to every site visitor, including anonymous ones. Anyone who can see an attachment URL can read, overwrite, delete, and list every blob in the container for the SAS lifetime. A companion functional bug (blob path appended after the query string, producing broken URLs) shows this code path was never exercised end to end. Shared-key mode (default) and non-Azure backends are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified at commit `5a3746aaed49761e171c2cbfe793267c959829fd` (uploadfs 1.27.0 in the apostrophe monorepo).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause: a credential-bearing client URL is reused as the public base URL. The chain:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Credential-embedded client: [azure.js#L123-L125](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/5a3746aaed49761e171c2cbfe793267c959829fd/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/azure.js#L123-L125) — `new BlobServiceClient(&amp;#34;https://&amp;lt;account&amp;gt;.blob.core.windows.net?&amp;lt;SAS query string&amp;gt;&amp;#34;)` where `cluster.key` is…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hhph-8536-gfq5</guid>
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