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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 23:59:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-112953</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112953</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 3.7.1 of the import-export module, predictable export archive filenames allow an unauthenticated requester to download another user&amp;#39;s export from publicly readable export storage before the archive expires or is removed. A user with export permission must first create the archive, and sites with exports disabled, private upload storage, or authenticated upload delivery are not exposed through this network-download path. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 3.7.1 of the import-export module, predictable export archive filenames allow an unauthenticated requester to download another user&amp;#39;s export from publicly readable export storage before the archive expires or is removed. A user with export permission must first create the archive, and sites with exports disabled, private upload storage, or authenticated upload delivery are not exposed through this network-download path. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112953</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm — ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5gc8-frw3-3vqm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @apostrophecms/import-export&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected configurations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All of the following must apply:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and**
2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @apostrophecms/import-export&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected configurations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All of the following must apply:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and**
2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5gc8-frw3-3vqm</guid>
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