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fkie_cve-2026-111062

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. From version 0.34.0-beta.1 until version 0.64.0, its SSH server does not require the signature algorithm in a public-key authentication signature to match the algorithm named in the authentication request. A client possessing an authorized RSA private key can announce rsa-sha2-512 while supplying a valid ssh-rsa SHA-1 signature, bypassing restrictions or producing misleading audit records when applications rely on the requested algorithm. A valid private-key signature remains required, and russh clients are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.64.0.

GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf — A russh SSH server accepts a publickey authentication whose signature uses a different algorithm than the one named in…

Affected: crates.io: russh

### Details

In `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`, `server_read_auth_request_pk` (0.63.3, around lines 880-990):

* The requested algorithm name (`pubkey_algo`) is read and only used to decode the key: `PublicKeyOrCertificate::decode(&pubkey_algo, &pubkey_key)`. The derived `hash_alg` is then dropped (`PublicKeyOrCertificate::PublicKey { ref key, .. }`). * The signature blob is decoded (`Signature::decode`) and verified with `Verifier::verify(&pubkey, &buf, &sig)`. `ssh-key` picks the hash from **the signature's own algorithm** (`sig.algorithm()`). * `pubkey_algo` and `sig.algorithm()` are never compared.

So for an RSA key, the request can say `rsa-sha2-512` while the signature is `ssh-rsa`. The signature is valid for SHA-1, verification succeeds, and `Handler::auth_publickey` is called.

**Affected versions: every russh release, from the first (`0.34.0-beta.1`, 2022-03) through 0.63.3 and current `main`.** The behaviour is inherited from `thrussh`, which russh was forked from.

The mechanism changed over time, but the outcome is the same: the hash is always taken from the signature blob, never checked against the request.

* **Up to 0.46:** after reading the algorithm name inside the signature blob, russh overwrites the key's hash with it (`pubkey.set_algorithm(algo_)`), then verifies. * **From 0.47/0.48 (move to `ssh-key`):** the signature is decoded with its own algorithm (`sig_workaround::Sig::decode`, later `Signature::decode`) and verified with it.

Confirmed by running…

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-111062

Affected: Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh