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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-110018</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder &amp;amp; Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =&amp;gt; __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block&amp;#39;s `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType=&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder &amp;amp; Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =&amp;gt; __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block&amp;#39;s `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType=&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-j3rc-5xc4-8hjg</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j3rc-5xc4-8hjg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder &amp;amp; Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =&amp;gt; __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block&amp;#39;s `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType=&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder &amp;amp; Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =&amp;gt; __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block&amp;#39;s `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType=&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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