https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 23 Oct 2026 02:20:12 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-109125 <p>In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.26.1, an observable cache-level side-channel can be exposed with &#39;unwanted-reply-threshold &gt; 0&#39; configurations (not a default configuration). If a response-like UDP datagram reaches the upstream source port currently used by a recursive query, but its TXID does not match any pending query, Unbound counts the packet as an unwanted reply. When the accumulated count reaches the configured threshold, Unbound clears the worker&#39;s RRset cache and message cache. This cache clear action does not destroy the current upstream UDP pending query. Therefore, an external observer can distinguish whether a candidate port matches the current upstream source port by checking whether an existing cached item has been cleared. This is a cache side-channel vulnerability that can be used to probe the upstream source port. Although the attack is not feasible on default configurations and the suggested value (10 million) makes it an ureliable attack on a public resolver, in scenarios where the attacker can keep a concurrent query window alive, the attacker can first filter the source port and then perform birthday-style guessing against the TXID, making cache poisoning a feasible attack path.</p> <p>In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.26.1, an observable cache-level side-channel can be exposed with &#39;unwanted-reply-threshold &gt; 0&#39; configurations (not a default configuration). If a response-like UDP datagram reaches the upstream source port currently used by a recursive query, but its TXID does not match any pending query, Unbound counts the packet as an unwanted reply. When the accumulated count reaches the configured threshold, Unbound clears the worker&#39;s RRset cache and message cache. This cache clear action does not destroy the current upstream UDP pending query. Therefore, an external observer can distinguish whether a candidate port matches the current upstream source port by checking whether an existing cached item has been cleared. This is a cache side-channel vulnerability that can be used to probe the upstream source port. Although the attack is not feasible on default configurations and the suggested value (10 million) makes it an ureliable attack on a public resolver, in scenarios where the attacker can keep a concurrent query window alive, the attacker can first filter the source port and then perform birthday-style guessing against the TXID, making cache poisoning a feasible attack path.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-109125 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-66rc-377g-m4m4 <p>In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.26.1, an observable cache-level side-channel can be exposed with &#39;unwanted-reply-threshold &gt; 0&#39; configurations (not a default configuration). If a response-like UDP datagram reaches the upstream source port currently used by a recursive query, but its TXID does not match any pending query, Unbound counts the packet as an unwanted reply. When the accumulated count reaches the configured threshold, Unbound clears the worker&#39;s RRset cache and message cache. This cache clear action does not destroy the current upstream UDP pending query. Therefore, an external observer can distinguish whether a candidate port matches the current upstream source port by checking whether an existing cached item has been cleared. This is a cache side-channel vulnerability that can be used to probe the upstream source port. Although the attack is not feasible on default configurations and the suggested value (10 million) makes it an ureliable attack on a public resolver, in scenarios where the attacker can keep a concurrent query window alive, the attacker can first filter the source port and then perform birthday-style guessing against the TXID, making cache poisoning a feasible attack path.</p> <p>In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.26.1, an observable cache-level side-channel can be exposed with &#39;unwanted-reply-threshold &gt; 0&#39; configurations (not a default configuration). If a response-like UDP datagram reaches the upstream source port currently used by a recursive query, but its TXID does not match any pending query, Unbound counts the packet as an unwanted reply. When the accumulated count reaches the configured threshold, Unbound clears the worker&#39;s RRset cache and message cache. This cache clear action does not destroy the current upstream UDP pending query. Therefore, an external observer can distinguish whether a candidate port matches the current upstream source port by checking whether an existing cached item has been cleared. This is a cache side-channel vulnerability that can be used to probe the upstream source port. Although the attack is not feasible on default configurations and the suggested value (10 million) makes it an ureliable attack on a public resolver, in scenarios where the attacker can keep a concurrent query window alive, the attacker can first filter the source port and then perform birthday-style guessing against the TXID, making cache poisoning a feasible attack path.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-66rc-377g-m4m4 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4073 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Unbound ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Daten zu manipulieren und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Unbound ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Daten zu manipulieren und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4073