https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 11 Oct 2026 22:46:05 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107841 <p>pacioli provides least-privilege governance and a governed agent broker for ERPNext. From version 0.9.6 until version 0.10.0, the pacioli-guard document-layer consent gate allows nested cancellation operations to ride any consent established by an enclosing governed act without checking whether the marker authorizes cancellation. A credential with API Key Scope.require_consent can submit a caller-controlled Sales Invoice or other supported document under a valid human-minted submit marker and reach Document.cancel() for a different pre-existing submitted document, bypassing the marker&#39;s document and act binding, single-use spend, and denial audit. The unauthorized cancellation can reverse the target document&#39;s ledger effect; principals without a consent-gated grant are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.</p> <p>pacioli provides least-privilege governance and a governed agent broker for ERPNext. From version 0.9.6 until version 0.10.0, the pacioli-guard document-layer consent gate allows nested cancellation operations to ride any consent established by an enclosing governed act without checking whether the marker authorizes cancellation. A credential with API Key Scope.require_consent can submit a caller-controlled Sales Invoice or other supported document under a valid human-minted submit marker and reach Document.cancel() for a different pre-existing submitted document, bypassing the marker&#39;s document and act binding, single-use spend, and denial audit. The unauthorized cancellation can reverse the target document&#39;s ledger effect; principals without a consent-gated grant are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107841 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pacioli-guard</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`pacioli-guard`&#39;s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to &#34;ride&#34; the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own.</p> <p>The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**.</p> <p>This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document&#39;s identity is caller-controlled:</p> <p>- `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice&#39;s item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(&#34;Asset&#34;, d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pacioli-guard</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`pacioli-guard`&#39;s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to &#34;ride&#34; the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own.</p> <p>The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**.</p> <p>This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document&#39;s identity is caller-controlled:</p> <p>- `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice&#39;s item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(&#34;Asset&#34;, d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4