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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107770</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107770</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Photo Engine (Media Organizer &amp;amp; Lightroom) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 6.5.6 This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete arbitrary media attachments via wp_delete_attachment and upload new attachments to the site, actions that require the upload_files or edit_others_posts capabilities. A Subscriber-level user can obtain their own wplr_auth_token directly from the profile.php page source, because the admin screen guard in Meow_WPLR_Sync_Admin::__construct() is commented out, causing wp_localize_script to leak the token into every admin page view; this token can then be used from a cookie-less HTTP session to invoke destructive actions on the /?wplr-sync-api endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Photo Engine (Media Organizer &amp;amp; Lightroom) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 6.5.6 This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete arbitrary media attachments via wp_delete_attachment and upload new attachments to the site, actions that require the upload_files or edit_others_posts capabilities. A Subscriber-level user can obtain their own wplr_auth_token directly from the profile.php page source, because the admin screen guard in Meow_WPLR_Sync_Admin::__construct() is commented out, causing wp_localize_script to leak the token into every admin page view; this token can then be used from a cookie-less HTTP session to invoke destructive actions on the /?wplr-sync-api endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107770</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-567q-wwf7-9p59</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-567q-wwf7-9p59</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Photo Engine (Media Organizer &amp;amp; Lightroom) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 6.5.6 This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete arbitrary media attachments via wp_delete_attachment and upload new attachments to the site, actions that require the upload_files or edit_others_posts capabilities. A Subscriber-level user can obtain their own wplr_auth_token directly from the profile.php page source, because the admin screen guard in Meow_WPLR_Sync_Admin::__construct() is commented out, causing wp_localize_script to leak the token into every admin page view; this token can then be used from a cookie-less HTTP session to invoke destructive actions on the /?wplr-sync-api endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Photo Engine (Media Organizer &amp;amp; Lightroom) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 6.5.6 This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete arbitrary media attachments via wp_delete_attachment and upload new attachments to the site, actions that require the upload_files or edit_others_posts capabilities. A Subscriber-level user can obtain their own wplr_auth_token directly from the profile.php page source, because the admin screen guard in Meow_WPLR_Sync_Admin::__construct() is commented out, causing wp_localize_script to leak the token into every admin page view; this token can then be used from a cookie-less HTTP session to invoke destructive actions on the /?wplr-sync-api endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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