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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107758</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107758</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Colibri Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;comment&amp;#39; parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.390 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The injected payload survives storage because the widened comment allow-list permits SVG elements with arbitrary data-* attributes; execution occurs because colibri.js, enqueued globally on every front-end page, reads the stored data-target value via jQuery.data() — which HTML-entity-decodes it — and passes the resulting string directly into jQuery(), which parses a leading &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; as HTML and fires the embedded event handler.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Colibri Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;comment&amp;#39; parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.390 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The injected payload survives storage because the widened comment allow-list permits SVG elements with arbitrary data-* attributes; execution occurs because colibri.js, enqueued globally on every front-end page, reads the stored data-target value via jQuery.data() — which HTML-entity-decodes it — and passes the resulting string directly into jQuery(), which parses a leading &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; as HTML and fires the embedded event handler.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-j6m3-8cm2-pm6p</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j6m3-8cm2-pm6p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Colibri Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;comment&amp;#39; parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.390 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The injected payload survives storage because the widened comment allow-list permits SVG elements with arbitrary data-* attributes; execution occurs because colibri.js, enqueued globally on every front-end page, reads the stored data-target value via jQuery.data() — which HTML-entity-decodes it — and passes the resulting string directly into jQuery(), which parses a leading &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; as HTML and fires the embedded event handler.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Colibri Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;comment&amp;#39; parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.390 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The injected payload survives storage because the widened comment allow-list permits SVG elements with arbitrary data-* attributes; execution occurs because colibri.js, enqueued globally on every front-end page, reads the stored data-target value via jQuery.data() — which HTML-entity-decodes it — and passes the resulting string directly into jQuery(), which parses a leading &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; as HTML and fires the embedded event handler.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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