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fkie_cve-2026-104795

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**

The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

## Affected Code

### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_…

GHSA-98f3-7g2j-289q

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

## Affected Code

### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_…