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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-104755</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104755</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The WP Compress – Instant Performance &amp;amp; Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin&amp;#39;s settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role — including Subscriber — the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin&amp;#39;s optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The WP Compress – Instant Performance &amp;amp; Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin&amp;#39;s settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role — including Subscriber — the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin&amp;#39;s optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104755</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-869x-hw98-gf6f</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-869x-hw98-gf6f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The WP Compress – Instant Performance &amp;amp; Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin&amp;#39;s settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role — including Subscriber — the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin&amp;#39;s optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The WP Compress – Instant Performance &amp;amp; Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin&amp;#39;s settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role — including Subscriber — the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin&amp;#39;s optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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