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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102894</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102894</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. From 0.7.1 until 2.2.2, the /auth/saml/callback endpoint decoded SAML XML, used its NameID and attributes to resolve or provision a user, and minted a gpustack_session JWT without calling OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response to verify the signature, issuer, audience, destination, or time conditions. Any network client could submit an identity for an existing user, including an administrator, or provision a new non-administrator account, even when SAML was not configured. Response and Assertion identifiers were not consumed, so captured signed responses could also be replayed. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. From 0.7.1 until 2.2.2, the /auth/saml/callback endpoint decoded SAML XML, used its NameID and attributes to resolve or provision a user, and minted a gpustack_session JWT without calling OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response to verify the signature, issuer, audience, destination, or time conditions. Any network client could submit an identity for an existing user, including an administrator, or provision a new non-administrator account, even when SAML was not configured. Response and Assertion identifiers were not consumed, so captured signed responses could also be replayed. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102894</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-62m9-f875-rqw6 — GPUStack: SAML callback trusts an unverified SAMLResponse, allowing authentication bypass and account takeover</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-62m9-f875-rqw6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gpustack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The callback Base64-decodes the posted XML, reads NameID and attributes, resolves or provisions the user, and mints a gpustack_session JWT — but never calls OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response(), the step that verifies the signature, issuer, audience, destination, and time conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No credentials are required, and SAML SSO does not even need to be configured. The callback processes the payload and issues a session regardless of whether SAML is set up, so every deployment is affected, not only SAML-enabled ones. Anyone who can reach the endpoint over the network can authenticate as an arbitrary identity by posting a response that names it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- If the name matches an existing user (e.g. an administrator), the attacker receives that user&amp;#39;s session — full account takeover, including administrator access.
- Otherwise, a new non-admin user is provisioned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Administrator access grants full control over the deployment and the infrastructure it manages. Because Response/Assertion IDs are never consumed, a captured signed response also replays indefinitely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Precondition: network reachability to /auth/saml/callback. SAML SSO configuration is not required. A full proof-of-concept is available privately to maintainers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in gpustack 2.2.2:
- The SAML callback now validates the response via OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response() — signature, issuer, audience, destination, and time conditions — and rejects responses that fail, so forged or replayed asser…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gpustack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The callback Base64-decodes the posted XML, reads NameID and attributes, resolves or provisions the user, and mints a gpustack_session JWT — but never calls OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response(), the step that verifies the signature, issuer, audience, destination, and time conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No credentials are required, and SAML SSO does not even need to be configured. The callback processes the payload and issues a session regardless of whether SAML is set up, so every deployment is affected, not only SAML-enabled ones. Anyone who can reach the endpoint over the network can authenticate as an arbitrary identity by posting a response that names it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- If the name matches an existing user (e.g. an administrator), the attacker receives that user&amp;#39;s session — full account takeover, including administrator access.
- Otherwise, a new non-admin user is provisioned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Administrator access grants full control over the deployment and the infrastructure it manages. Because Response/Assertion IDs are never consumed, a captured signed response also replays indefinitely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Precondition: network reachability to /auth/saml/callback. SAML SSO configuration is not required. A full proof-of-concept is available privately to maintainers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in gpustack 2.2.2:
- The SAML callback now validates the response via OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response() — signature, issuer, audience, destination, and time conditions — and rejects responses that fail, so forged or replayed asser…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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