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    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-15879</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2026-15879</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-15879</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2026-15879</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102282</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102282</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;adm-zip is a JavaScript library for creating and extracting ZIP archives in Node.js. Prior to 0.6.1, adm-zip applies the Unix permission bits stored in a zip entry directly to the extracted file via `fs.chmodSync()` when `keepOriginalPermission=true` is passed to `extractAllTo()`/`extractEntryTo()` — and it never filters the setuid/setgid/sticky bits out of those bits. A zip crafted by an attacker can therefore produce an extracted binary with mode `04755`. When extraction runs as root (the default posture in Docker builds, CI runners, and privileged install steps — the exact environments where this flag is used), the resulting root-owned setuid file is executed later by a lesser-privileged user, turning the attacker&amp;#39;s code into a root execution. Version 0.6.1 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;adm-zip is a JavaScript library for creating and extracting ZIP archives in Node.js. Prior to 0.6.1, adm-zip applies the Unix permission bits stored in a zip entry directly to the extracted file via `fs.chmodSync()` when `keepOriginalPermission=true` is passed to `extractAllTo()`/`extractEntryTo()` — and it never filters the setuid/setgid/sticky bits out of those bits. A zip crafted by an attacker can therefore produce an extracted binary with mode `04755`. When extraction runs as root (the default posture in Docker builds, CI runners, and privileged install steps — the exact environments where this flag is used), the resulting root-owned setuid file is executed later by a lesser-privileged user, turning the attacker&amp;#39;s code into a root execution. Version 0.6.1 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102282</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j5f4-cc29-5x44 — adm-zip extraction preserves SUID/SGID bits from untrusted ZIPs -&gt; local privilege escalation</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j5f4-cc29-5x44</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: adm-zip&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;adm-zip applies the Unix permission bits stored in a zip entry directly to the extracted file via `fs.chmodSync()` when `keepOriginalPermission=true` is passed to `extractAllTo()`/`extractEntryTo()` — and it never filters the setuid/setgid/sticky bits out of those bits. A zip crafted by an attacker can therefore produce an extracted binary with mode `04755`. When extraction runs as root (the default posture in Docker builds, CI runners, and privileged install steps — the exact environments where this flag is used), the resulting root-owned setuid file is executed later by a lesser-privileged user, turning the attacker&amp;#39;s code into a root execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mode a zip entry wants is read back from the external file attributes in the header, and the mask used keeps every special bit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// headers/entryHeader.js:187
get fileAttr() {
    return (_attr || 0) &amp;gt;&amp;gt; 16 &amp;amp; 0xfff;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`0xfff` is `0o7777` — it preserves setuid (`0o4000`), setgid (`0o2000`) and the sticky bit (`0o1000`) along with the rwx bits. Shifting by 16 is the standard Unix convention for where zip stores the mode; the mask is the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the flag is on, that value goes straight to the write:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// adm-zip.js:726-727 (extractEntryTo, and identically in extractAllTo)
const fileAttr = keepOriginalPermission ? entry.header.fileAttr : undefined;
filetools.writeFileTo(target, content, overwrite, fileAttr);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// util/utils.js:94
self.fs.chmodSync(path, attr || 0o666);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: adm-zip&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;adm-zip applies the Unix permission bits stored in a zip entry directly to the extracted file via `fs.chmodSync()` when `keepOriginalPermission=true` is passed to `extractAllTo()`/`extractEntryTo()` — and it never filters the setuid/setgid/sticky bits out of those bits. A zip crafted by an attacker can therefore produce an extracted binary with mode `04755`. When extraction runs as root (the default posture in Docker builds, CI runners, and privileged install steps — the exact environments where this flag is used), the resulting root-owned setuid file is executed later by a lesser-privileged user, turning the attacker&amp;#39;s code into a root execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mode a zip entry wants is read back from the external file attributes in the header, and the mask used keeps every special bit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// headers/entryHeader.js:187
get fileAttr() {
    return (_attr || 0) &amp;gt;&amp;gt; 16 &amp;amp; 0xfff;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`0xfff` is `0o7777` — it preserves setuid (`0o4000`), setgid (`0o2000`) and the sticky bit (`0o1000`) along with the rwx bits. Shifting by 16 is the standard Unix convention for where zip stores the mode; the mask is the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the flag is on, that value goes straight to the write:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// adm-zip.js:726-727 (extractEntryTo, and identically in extractAllTo)
const fileAttr = keepOriginalPermission ? entry.header.fileAttr : undefined;
filetools.writeFileTo(target, content, overwrite, fileAttr);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// util/utils.js:94
self.fs.chmodSync(path, attr || 0o666);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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