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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-100397</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100397</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Rucio is a scientific data management framework. From 1.14.0 until 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, and 41.1.1, validate_auth_token in lib/rucio/core/authentication.py does not distinguish short-lived SSH challenge nonces from authentication tokens stored in the same token table. An unauthenticated attacker can request /auth/ssh_challenge_token for an arbitrary account by supplying X-Rucio-Account, then present the returned X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token as X-Rucio-Auth-Token to authenticate to other API endpoints as that account, including an administrative account. This issue is fixed in versions 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, and 41.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Rucio is a scientific data management framework. From 1.14.0 until 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, and 41.1.1, validate_auth_token in lib/rucio/core/authentication.py does not distinguish short-lived SSH challenge nonces from authentication tokens stored in the same token table. An unauthenticated attacker can request /auth/ssh_challenge_token for an arbitrary account by supplying X-Rucio-Account, then present the returned X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token as X-Rucio-Auth-Token to authenticate to other API endpoints as that account, including an administrative account. This issue is fixed in versions 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, and 41.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100397</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-x585-4vv8-2mh2 — Rucio: Unauthenticated administrator impersonation through SSH challenge tokens</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x585-4vv8-2mh2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: rucio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SSH challenge tokens are mistakenly accepted as valid credentials during the authentication token validation process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While an SSH challenge token is intended as a short-lived nonce for use in a subsequent SSH key exchange, the function to validate authentication tokens does not differentiate between these and actual authentication tokens. Because challenge tokens are generated based on an account name provided via headers without requiring prior authentication, an unauthenticated attacker can request a valid &amp;#34;challenge&amp;#34; token for any account (including administrative ones) and use it to authenticate against other API endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists because SSH challenge tokens are stored in the same database table as regular authentication tokens and `validate_auth_token` in `lib/rucio/core/authentication.py` accepts these &amp;#34;challenge&amp;#34; tokens. An attacker can obtain a challenge token for an account such as “root” via the REST API and then present it as a valid authentication bearer token:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Request a challenge token for an arbitrary account (e.g., &amp;#34;root&amp;#34;):
   `curl -i -H &amp;#34;X-Rucio-Account: root&amp;#34; https://rucio/auth/ssh_challenge_token`
2. The server returns a `200 OK` with the header `X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token`.
3. The attacker can then use this specific token within the ten-second challenge lifetime as an authentication credential in subsequent requests to the Rucio API:
  `curl -H &amp;#34;X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $CHALLENGE_TOKEN&amp;#34;  https://ruci…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: rucio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SSH challenge tokens are mistakenly accepted as valid credentials during the authentication token validation process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While an SSH challenge token is intended as a short-lived nonce for use in a subsequent SSH key exchange, the function to validate authentication tokens does not differentiate between these and actual authentication tokens. Because challenge tokens are generated based on an account name provided via headers without requiring prior authentication, an unauthenticated attacker can request a valid &amp;#34;challenge&amp;#34; token for any account (including administrative ones) and use it to authenticate against other API endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists because SSH challenge tokens are stored in the same database table as regular authentication tokens and `validate_auth_token` in `lib/rucio/core/authentication.py` accepts these &amp;#34;challenge&amp;#34; tokens. An attacker can obtain a challenge token for an account such as “root” via the REST API and then present it as a valid authentication bearer token:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Request a challenge token for an arbitrary account (e.g., &amp;#34;root&amp;#34;):
   `curl -i -H &amp;#34;X-Rucio-Account: root&amp;#34; https://rucio/auth/ssh_challenge_token`
2. The server returns a `200 OK` with the header `X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token`.
3. The attacker can then use this specific token within the ten-second challenge lifetime as an authentication credential in subsequent requests to the Rucio API:
  `curl -H &amp;#34;X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $CHALLENGE_TOKEN&amp;#34;  https://ruci…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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