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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:09:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-66455</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-66455</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. Starting in version 0.9.2 and prior to version 0.16.0, LMDeploy&amp;#39;s PyTorch DistServe/PD-disaggregation control plane used `recv_pyobj()` to deserialize messages received through a ZeroMQ PULL socket. PyZMQ implements `recv_pyobj()` using Python pickle deserialization, which can execute arbitrary code while reconstructing an object. The peer address used by the receiver was supplied through the `POST /distserve/p2p_connect` HTTP endpoint. An attacker who could reach an affected DistServe API server could cause the server to connect to an attacker-controlled ZeroMQ endpoint and deserialize a crafted pickle payload. API-key authentication is not enabled unless the operator explicitly configures it. As a result, affected DistServe deployments without API keys allowed unauthenticated remote code execution with the privileges of the LMDeploy serving process. This issue affects the PyTorch backend when PD-disaggregation/DistServe is enabled. Ordinary deployments that do not use the affected disaggregated-serving path do not expose this data flow. The fix was released in LMDeploy 0.16.0. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should prevent untrusted clients from reaching `/distserve/*` endpoints, restrict the DistServe HTTP and ZeroMQ control planes to trusted cluster networks, configure API-key authentication, and block arbitrary outbound ZeroMQ connections from serving nodes. These measures reduce e…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. Starting in version 0.9.2 and prior to version 0.16.0, LMDeploy&amp;#39;s PyTorch DistServe/PD-disaggregation control plane used `recv_pyobj()` to deserialize messages received through a ZeroMQ PULL socket. PyZMQ implements `recv_pyobj()` using Python pickle deserialization, which can execute arbitrary code while reconstructing an object. The peer address used by the receiver was supplied through the `POST /distserve/p2p_connect` HTTP endpoint. An attacker who could reach an affected DistServe API server could cause the server to connect to an attacker-controlled ZeroMQ endpoint and deserialize a crafted pickle payload. API-key authentication is not enabled unless the operator explicitly configures it. As a result, affected DistServe deployments without API keys allowed unauthenticated remote code execution with the privileges of the LMDeploy serving process. This issue affects the PyTorch backend when PD-disaggregation/DistServe is enabled. Ordinary deployments that do not use the affected disaggregated-serving path do not expose this data flow. The fix was released in LMDeploy 0.16.0. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should prevent untrusted clients from reaching `/distserve/*` endpoints, restrict the DistServe HTTP and ZeroMQ control planes to trusted cluster networks, configure API-key authentication, and block arbitrary outbound ZeroMQ connections from serving nodes. These measures reduce e…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-66455</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2vh9-42vm-xmv2 — LMDeploy has Remote Code Execution by Pickle Deserialization via handle_zmq_recv in lmdeploy/lmdeploy/pytorch/disagg/co…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2vh9-42vm-xmv2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: lmdeploy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LMDeploy&amp;#39;s PyTorch DistServe/PD-disaggregation control plane used
`recv_pyobj()` to deserialize messages received through a ZeroMQ PULL
socket. PyZMQ implements `recv_pyobj()` using Python pickle
deserialization, which can execute arbitrary code while reconstructing
an object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The peer address used by the receiver was supplied through the
`POST /distserve/p2p_connect` HTTP endpoint. An attacker who could reach
an affected DistServe API server could cause the server to connect to an
attacker-controlled ZeroMQ endpoint and deserialize a crafted pickle
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;API-key authentication is not enabled unless the operator explicitly
configures it. As a result, affected DistServe deployments without API
keys allowed unauthenticated remote code execution with the privileges
of the LMDeploy serving process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects the PyTorch backend when PD-disaggregation/DistServe
is enabled. Ordinary deployments that do not use the affected
disaggregated-serving path do not expose this data flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- HTTP entry point:
  `lmdeploy/serve/openai/endpoints/distserve.py`,
  `POST /distserve/p2p_connect`
- Attacker-controlled peer address:
  `DistServeConnectionRequest.remote_engine_endpoint_info.zmq_address`
- Vulnerable receiver:
  `lmdeploy/pytorch/disagg/conn/engine_conn.py`,
  `EngineP2PConnection.handle_zmq_recv()`
- Unsafe operation: `recv_pyobj()`, which performs pickle deserialization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable data flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A caller submits a DistServe P2P…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: lmdeploy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LMDeploy&amp;#39;s PyTorch DistServe/PD-disaggregation control plane used
`recv_pyobj()` to deserialize messages received through a ZeroMQ PULL
socket. PyZMQ implements `recv_pyobj()` using Python pickle
deserialization, which can execute arbitrary code while reconstructing
an object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The peer address used by the receiver was supplied through the
`POST /distserve/p2p_connect` HTTP endpoint. An attacker who could reach
an affected DistServe API server could cause the server to connect to an
attacker-controlled ZeroMQ endpoint and deserialize a crafted pickle
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;API-key authentication is not enabled unless the operator explicitly
configures it. As a result, affected DistServe deployments without API
keys allowed unauthenticated remote code execution with the privileges
of the LMDeploy serving process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects the PyTorch backend when PD-disaggregation/DistServe
is enabled. Ordinary deployments that do not use the affected
disaggregated-serving path do not expose this data flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- HTTP entry point:
  `lmdeploy/serve/openai/endpoints/distserve.py`,
  `POST /distserve/p2p_connect`
- Attacker-controlled peer address:
  `DistServeConnectionRequest.remote_engine_endpoint_info.zmq_address`
- Vulnerable receiver:
  `lmdeploy/pytorch/disagg/conn/engine_conn.py`,
  `EngineP2PConnection.handle_zmq_recv()`
- Unsafe operation: `recv_pyobj()`, which performs pickle deserialization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable data flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A caller submits a DistServe P2P…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2vh9-42vm-xmv2</guid>
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