https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 26 Oct 2026 03:55:56 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pqqc-8v73-9gg2 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/v2</p> <p>### Summary Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in eKuiper allows an attacker with permissions to register external services or create rules to induce the eKuiper server to make requests to unintended network locations, such as internal services, loopback interfaces (localhost), or cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p>### Details Prior to v2.4.0, eKuiper external service registrations and HTTP invocations did not validate destination IP addresses. An attacker with access to the eKuiper management API could register an external service pointing to an internal address (such as `http://127.0.0.1:9081` or other internal network services) and trigger queries using service functions (e.g. `SELECT tsschemaless(...) FROM demo`). This allows probing internal networks, leaking sensitive information (such as internal endpoints/credentials), or interacting with internal APIs accessible to the eKuiper host.</p> <p>### PoC 1. Create an external service with an address pointing to an internal network / localhost:</p> <p>```json { &#34;interfaces&#34;: { &#34;tsschemaless&#34;: { &#34;address&#34;: &#34;http://127.0.0.1:9081&#34;, &#34;protocol&#34;: &#34;rest&#34;, &#34;options&#34;: { &#34;insecureSkipVerify&#34;: true, &#34;headers&#34;: { &#34;Accept-Charset&#34;: &#34;utf-8&#34; } }, &#34;schemaless&#34;: true } } } ``` 2. Load it to eKuiper and create a rule invoking it, e.g.: `SELECT tsschemaless(&#34;get&#34;, &#34;/metadata/sources/yaml/mqtt&#34;, *) FROM demo`. 3. Run the rule. When data flows through the stream, the respons…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/v2</p> <p>### Summary Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in eKuiper allows an attacker with permissions to register external services or create rules to induce the eKuiper server to make requests to unintended network locations, such as internal services, loopback interfaces (localhost), or cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p>### Details Prior to v2.4.0, eKuiper external service registrations and HTTP invocations did not validate destination IP addresses. An attacker with access to the eKuiper management API could register an external service pointing to an internal address (such as `http://127.0.0.1:9081` or other internal network services) and trigger queries using service functions (e.g. `SELECT tsschemaless(...) FROM demo`). This allows probing internal networks, leaking sensitive information (such as internal endpoints/credentials), or interacting with internal APIs accessible to the eKuiper host.</p> <p>### PoC 1. Create an external service with an address pointing to an internal network / localhost:</p> <p>```json { &#34;interfaces&#34;: { &#34;tsschemaless&#34;: { &#34;address&#34;: &#34;http://127.0.0.1:9081&#34;, &#34;protocol&#34;: &#34;rest&#34;, &#34;options&#34;: { &#34;insecureSkipVerify&#34;: true, &#34;headers&#34;: { &#34;Accept-Charset&#34;: &#34;utf-8&#34; } }, &#34;schemaless&#34;: true } } } ``` 2. Load it to eKuiper and create a rule invoking it, e.g.: `SELECT tsschemaless(&#34;get&#34;, &#34;/metadata/sources/yaml/mqtt&#34;, *) FROM demo`. 3. Run the rule. When data flows through the stream, the respons…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pqqc-8v73-9gg2