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      <title>fkie_cve-2025-12999</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-12999</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;UrlUtil.getBaseUrl builds the absolute URLs in a response — download links, icons, asset and API URLs — from the X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix request headers, with no check on whether the sender was a trusted proxy, falling back to the client-supplied Host header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Those responses are cached under keys that do not include the host (extension.json since 0.6.0, namespace.details.json since 0.9.0, sitemap since 0.14.5, latest.extension.version.vscode since 0.34.2). A single request carrying a forged header therefore places attacker-chosen URLs into an entry served to every other client for the lifetime of that entry — one hour by default, and cluster-wide where ovsx.redis.enabled is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The VSIX download URL, its signature URL and the public key URL are all derived from the same base URL, so extension signing does not limit the impact: an attacker who poisons an entry supplies the package, the signature over it, and the key used to verify it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitability depends on deployment topology. A server reachable directly by clients, or fronted by a proxy that relays the client&amp;#39;s X-Forwarded-Ho…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;UrlUtil.getBaseUrl builds the absolute URLs in a response — download links, icons, asset and API URLs — from the X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix request headers, with no check on whether the sender was a trusted proxy, falling back to the client-supplied Host header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Those responses are cached under keys that do not include the host (extension.json since 0.6.0, namespace.details.json since 0.9.0, sitemap since 0.14.5, latest.extension.version.vscode since 0.34.2). A single request carrying a forged header therefore places attacker-chosen URLs into an entry served to every other client for the lifetime of that entry — one hour by default, and cluster-wide where ovsx.redis.enabled is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The VSIX download URL, its signature URL and the public key URL are all derived from the same base URL, so extension signing does not limit the impact: an attacker who poisons an entry supplies the package, the signature over it, and the key used to verify it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitability depends on deployment topology. A server reachable directly by clients, or fronted by a proxy that relays the client&amp;#39;s X-Forwarded-Ho…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-12999</guid>
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