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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:44:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-1009 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoqu…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-1009</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-1009</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-1009</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-53645</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-53645</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider the following program:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;amp;mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_spin_lock(&amp;amp;l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;amp;t, &amp;amp;n-&amp;gt;rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;amp;l);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#39;s incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn&amp;#39;t
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node&amp;#39;s lifetime. Therefore
the node&amp;#39;s refcount can be decr&amp;#39;d to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free&amp;#39;d, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complai…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider the following program:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;amp;mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_spin_lock(&amp;amp;l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;amp;t, &amp;amp;n-&amp;gt;rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;amp;l);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#39;s incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn&amp;#39;t
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node&amp;#39;s lifetime. Therefore
the node&amp;#39;s refcount can be decr&amp;#39;d to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free&amp;#39;d, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complai…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-53645</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pw78-hwhh-29v2</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pw78-hwhh-29v2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider the following program:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;amp;mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_spin_lock(&amp;amp;l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;amp;t, &amp;amp;n-&amp;gt;rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;amp;l);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#39;s incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn&amp;#39;t
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node&amp;#39;s lifetime. Therefore
the node&amp;#39;s refcount can be decr&amp;#39;d to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free&amp;#39;d, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complai…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider the following program:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;amp;mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_spin_lock(&amp;amp;l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;amp;t, &amp;amp;n-&amp;gt;rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;amp;l);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#39;s incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn&amp;#39;t
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node&amp;#39;s lifetime. Therefore
the node&amp;#39;s refcount can be decr&amp;#39;d to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free&amp;#39;d, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complai…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pw78-hwhh-29v2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2024:2394 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2024:2394</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel: Bluetooth BR/EDR PIN Pairing procedure is vulnerable to an impersonation attack kernel: ovl: fix warning in ovl_create_real() kernel: memcg does not limit the number of POSIX file locks allowing memory exhaustion kernel: vmwgfx: NULL pointer dereference in vmw_cmd_dx_define_query kernel: integer overflow in l2cap_config_req() in net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c kernel: i2c: mlxbf: prevent stack overflow in mlxbf_i2c_smbus_start_transaction() kernel: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix u8 overflow kernel: hwmon: (coretemp) fix pci device refcount leak in nv1a_ram_new() kernel: tracing: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context on RT kernel kernel: net: mdio: unexport __init-annotated mdio_bus_init() kernel: arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs. kernel: mm/uffd: fix pte marker when fork() without fork event kernel: Bluetooth: Fix a buffer overflow in mgmt_mesh_add() kernel: tty: n_gsm: add sanity check for gsm-&amp;gt;receive in gsm_receive_buf() kernel: ftrace: Fix NULL pointer dereference in is_ftrace_trampoline when ftrace is dead kernel: tee: add overflow check in register_shm_helper() kernel: tty: n_gsm: fix deadlock and link starvation in outgoing data path kernel: PM: hibernate: defer device probing when resuming from hibernation kernel: ext4: don&amp;#39;t allow journal inode to have encrypt flag kernel: ext4: fix delayed allocation bug in ext4_clu_mapped for bigalloc + inline kernel: erofs: fix order &amp;gt;= MAX_ORDER warning due to crafted negative i_size kernel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: F…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel: Bluetooth BR/EDR PIN Pairing procedure is vulnerable to an impersonation attack kernel: ovl: fix warning in ovl_create_real() kernel: memcg does not limit the number of POSIX file locks allowing memory exhaustion kernel: vmwgfx: NULL pointer dereference in vmw_cmd_dx_define_query kernel: integer overflow in l2cap_config_req() in net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c kernel: i2c: mlxbf: prevent stack overflow in mlxbf_i2c_smbus_start_transaction() kernel: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix u8 overflow kernel: hwmon: (coretemp) fix pci device refcount leak in nv1a_ram_new() kernel: tracing: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context on RT kernel kernel: net: mdio: unexport __init-annotated mdio_bus_init() kernel: arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs. kernel: mm/uffd: fix pte marker when fork() without fork event kernel: Bluetooth: Fix a buffer overflow in mgmt_mesh_add() kernel: tty: n_gsm: add sanity check for gsm-&amp;gt;receive in gsm_receive_buf() kernel: ftrace: Fix NULL pointer dereference in is_ftrace_trampoline when ftrace is dead kernel: tee: add overflow check in register_shm_helper() kernel: tty: n_gsm: fix deadlock and link starvation in outgoing data path kernel: PM: hibernate: defer device probing when resuming from hibernation kernel: ext4: don&amp;#39;t allow journal inode to have encrypt flag kernel: ext4: fix delayed allocation bug in ext4_clu_mapped for bigalloc + inline kernel: erofs: fix order &amp;gt;= MAX_ORDER warning due to crafted negative i_size kernel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: F…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2024:2394</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:21040-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2025:21040-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2025:21040-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2023-53645</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-53645</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 78 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning references. Consider the following program:   n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;amp;mapval, NULL);   /* skip error checking */   bpf_spin_lock(&amp;amp;l);   if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;amp;t, &amp;amp;n-&amp;gt;rb, less)) {     bpf_refcount_acquire(n);     /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */   }   bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;amp;l); It&amp;#39;s incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn&amp;#39;t necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop in it, the program has no ownership of the node&amp;#39;s lifetime. Therefore the node&amp;#39;s refcount can be decr&amp;#39;d to 0 at any time after the failing rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node might be free&amp;#39;d, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a 0 refcount. Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the expected complaint from…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 78 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning references. Consider the following program:   n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;amp;mapval, NULL);   /* skip error checking */   bpf_spin_lock(&amp;amp;l);   if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;amp;t, &amp;amp;n-&amp;gt;rb, less)) {     bpf_refcount_acquire(n);     /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */   }   bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;amp;l); It&amp;#39;s incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn&amp;#39;t necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop in it, the program has no ownership of the node&amp;#39;s lifetime. Therefore the node&amp;#39;s refcount can be decr&amp;#39;d to 0 at any time after the failing rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node might be free&amp;#39;d, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a 0 refcount. Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the expected complaint from…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-53645</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-2229 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2229</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen und andere nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen und andere nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2229</guid>
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