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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:50:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-10272</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2025-10272</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-10272</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2025-10272</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0252 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0252</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0252</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0252</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2022-49416</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-49416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an
old context and the new context&amp;#39;s replace_state is set to
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context
in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we
cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to
NULL after this point.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we&amp;#39;re not going to do
anything else in this function and can just return to
avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an
old context and the new context&amp;#39;s replace_state is set to
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context
in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we
cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to
NULL after this point.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we&amp;#39;re not going to do
anything else in this function and can just return to
avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-49416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qq39-f366-wjqw</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qq39-f366-wjqw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an
old context and the new context&amp;#39;s replace_state is set to
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context
in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we
cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to
NULL after this point.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we&amp;#39;re not going to do
anything else in this function and can just return to
avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an
old context and the new context&amp;#39;s replace_state is set to
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context
in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we
cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to
NULL after this point.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not
IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we&amp;#39;re not going to do
anything else in this function and can just return to
avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qq39-f366-wjqw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2025-1370 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/oesa-2025-1370</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ath5k: fix OOB in ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug was found during fuzzing. Stacktrace locates it in
ath5k_eeprom_convert_pcal_info_5111.
When none of the curve is selected in the loop, idx can go
up to AR5K_EEPROM_N_PD_CURVES. The line makes pd out of bound.
pd = &amp;amp;amp;chinfo[pier].pd_curves[idx];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are many OOB writes using pd later in the code. So I
added a sanity check for idx. Checks for other loops involving
AR5K_EEPROM_N_PD_CURVES are not needed as the loop index is not
used outside the loops.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The patch is NOT tested with real device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following is the fuzzing report&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8880174a4d60 by task modprobe/214&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 0 PID: 214 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.6.0 #1
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x76/0xa0
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x16/0x200
 ? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 ? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 __kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7c
 ? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 kasan_report+0xe/0x20
 ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x20
 ? ath5k_eeprom_init_11a_pcal_freq+0xbc0/0xbc0 [ath5k]
 ? ath5k_pci_eeprom_read+0x228/0x3c0 [ath5k]
 ath5k_eeprom_init+0x2513/0x6290 [ath5k]
 ? ath5k_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ath5k: fix OOB in ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug was found during fuzzing. Stacktrace locates it in
ath5k_eeprom_convert_pcal_info_5111.
When none of the curve is selected in the loop, idx can go
up to AR5K_EEPROM_N_PD_CURVES. The line makes pd out of bound.
pd = &amp;amp;amp;chinfo[pier].pd_curves[idx];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are many OOB writes using pd later in the code. So I
added a sanity check for idx. Checks for other loops involving
AR5K_EEPROM_N_PD_CURVES are not needed as the loop index is not
used outside the loops.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The patch is NOT tested with real device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following is the fuzzing report&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8880174a4d60 by task modprobe/214&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 0 PID: 214 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.6.0 #1
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x76/0xa0
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x16/0x200
 ? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 ? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 __kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7c
 ? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 kasan_report+0xe/0x20
 ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
 ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x20
 ? ath5k_eeprom_init_11a_pcal_freq+0xbc0/0xbc0 [ath5k]
 ? ath5k_pci_eeprom_read+0x228/0x3c0 [ath5k]
 ath5k_eeprom_init+0x2513/0x6290 [ath5k]
 ? ath5k_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/oesa-2025-1370</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2023:2458 — security update for kernel</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2023:2458</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;security update for kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;security update for kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2023:2458</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:1027-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2025:1027-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2025:1027-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2022-49416</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-49416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws and 142 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an old context and the new context&amp;#39;s replace_state is set to IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to NULL after this point. However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we&amp;#39;re not going to do anything else in this function and can just return to avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws and 142 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an old context and the new context&amp;#39;s replace_state is set to IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to NULL after this point. However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we&amp;#39;re not going to do anything else in this function and can just return to avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-49416</guid>
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