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  <updated>2026-10-01T21:07:00.271058+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-95625</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-95625 — Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T21:07:00.274802+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> tauri-plugin-updater</p>
<p>The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-95625"/>
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