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  <updated>2026-11-07T13:21:10.039443+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115909</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-115909 — zip: Unbounded Symlink-Target Handling Can Abort Or Exhaust Memory During Extraction</title>
    <updated>2026-11-07T13:21:10.056973+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> zip-rs zip2</p>
<p>zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 1.3.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract in src/read/mod.rs calls Vec::with_capacity for a symbolic link target using the attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed_size before reading entry data. A small archive can request an impossible capacity, causing the infallible allocation path to abort the process before the entry is validated. The failure cannot be contained with catch_unwind or a worker thread, allowing repeated denial of service in archive-processing applications. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115909"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q7v9-x93c-xqv3</id>
    <title>GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3 — zip: Unbounded Symlink-Target Handling Can Abort Or Exhaust Memory During Extraction</title>
    <updated>2026-11-07T13:21:10.057046+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zip</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The symbolic-link branch of `ZipArchive::extract_internal()` allocates a buffer using an attacker-declared size before reading any entry data. A 112-byte archive terminates the extracting process with `SIGABRT` through this infallible allocation.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>```rust
#[cfg(any(unix, windows))]
if file.is_symlink() {
    let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize); // @audit unbounded memory allocation
    file.read_to_end(&amp;mut target)?;
    drop(file);
    make_symlink(&amp;outpath, &amp;target, &amp;self.shared.files)?;
    continue;
}
```</p>
<p>[`src/read/mod.rs#L399-L405`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/6f09b3064ec87c3a69ea9f3413f9f9638b4aa446/src/read/mod.rs#L399-L405) (reviewed commit `6f09b306`); the same code is at [`src/read.rs#L417-L418`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/v8.6.0/src/read.rs#L417-L418) in released v8.6.0.</p>
<p>Both inputs are attacker-controlled:</p>
<p>- [`ZipFile::size()`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/6f09b3064ec87c3a69ea9f3413f9f9638b4aa446/src/read/zipfile.rs#L243-L246) returns `uncompressed_size` verbatim from the central directory record. A ZIP64 extended-information extra field widens it to a full `u64` ([`src/read/mod.rs#L619-L625`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/6f09b3064ec87c3a69ea9f3413f9f9638b4aa446/src/read/mod.rs#L619-L625)). It is never cross-checked against the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate bound for a symlink target.
- [`ZipFile::is_symlink()`](https://github.com/zip-rs…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q7v9-x93c-xqv3"/>
  </entry>
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