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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-01T09:17:29.649255+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-cloudiscovery-cve-2026-102937</id>
    <title>BREW-cloudiscovery-CVE-2026-102937 — Command injection via --prompt in activate.bat (batch activator)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T09:17:29.669104+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: cloudiscovery</p>
<p>`BatchActivator.quote()` returned its input unchanged, the only activator with
no escaping at all. `--prompt`, the `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` environment variable,
and the config file all set the prompt, and `activate.bat` writes it straight
into `@set "VAR=value"`. A prompt containing a double quote closes that string
early, and whatever follows runs as live cmd.exe syntax. For example, a venv
created with `--prompt 'x" &amp; calc &amp; "'` runs `calc` the moment someone runs
`activate.bat`.</p>
<p>Anyone who templates a prompt from untrusted input (a CI job using a branch
name, a wrapper script deriving an environment name from user input) hands an
attacker code execution in the shell of anyone who activates the resulting venv
on Windows.</p>
<p>Fixed in 21.7.12 by escaping the characters cmd.exe treats as live syntax
inside this construct.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-cloudiscovery-cve-2026-102937"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102937</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-102937 — virtualenv: Command injection via --prompt in activate.bat (batch activator)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T09:17:29.669215+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> pypa virtualenv</p>
<p>virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.7.12, BatchActivator.quote() returns prompt text unchanged before activate.bat inserts it into a cmd.exe set "VAR=value" statement. An attacker who influences --prompt, VIRTUALENV_PROMPT, or the corresponding configuration value can include a double quote that closes the assignment and leaves following cmd.exe operators as executable syntax. When a user activates the generated Windows environment, the injected commands run with that user's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 21.7.12.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102937"/>
  </entry>
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