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  <updated>2026-11-03T17:50:19.042101+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98638</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-98638 — KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()</title>
    <updated>2026-11-03T17:50:19.050075+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()</p>
<p>pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided
sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl()
and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing
!sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has
run.</p>
<p>Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length
cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98638"/>
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