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  <updated>2026-11-02T23:11:34.968312+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98687</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-98687 — thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses</title>
    <updated>2026-11-02T23:11:34.969396+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses</p>
<p>tb_xdp_properties_request() allocates room for 45 data dwords in its
252-byte response buffer.  The XDomain length field is six bits wide,
however, and a malicious peer can set it to 63.  After the fixed response
fields are subtracted, the driver treats this as 48 data dwords.</p>
<p>Commit 322e93448d90 ("thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to
allocation size") only bounds the copy against data_len.  If data_len is
at least 48, memcpy() reads 192 bytes from the 180-byte res-&gt;data array,
causing a 12-byte heap out-of-bounds read.  Commit 4db2bd2ed478
("thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size") limits
the earlier copy but does not constrain this header-derived length.</p>
<p>Reject response data lengths that exceed the allocated source buffer
before copying them into the assembled property block.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98687"/>
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