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  <updated>2026-11-09T13:39:07.007149+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115909</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-115909 — zip: Unbounded Symlink-Target Handling Can Abort Or Exhaust Memory During Extraction</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T13:39:07.032048+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> zip-rs zip2</p>
<p>zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 1.3.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract in src/read/mod.rs calls Vec::with_capacity for a symbolic link target using the attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed_size before reading entry data. A small archive can request an impossible capacity, causing the infallible allocation path to abort the process before the entry is validated. The failure cannot be contained with catch_unwind or a worker thread, allowing repeated denial of service in archive-processing applications. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115909"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rustsec-2026-0429</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0429 — zip: `ZipArchive::extract` aborts the process on a symlink entry with a large declared size</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T13:39:07.032178+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zip</p>
<p>`ZipArchive::extract()` sizes the symlink-target buffer from the uncompressed
size declared in the central directory record, before reading a single byte of
entry data:</p>
<p>```rust
let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize);
```</p>
<p>Both inputs are attacker-controlled. `ZipFile::size()` returns
`uncompressed_size` verbatim from the central directory, widened to a full `u64`
by a ZIP64 extended-information extra field, and is never cross-checked against
the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate
bound for a symlink target. `ZipFile::is_symlink()` is decided entirely by the
`S_IFLNK` bit of the external-attributes field.</p>
<p>`Vec::with_capacity()` is infallible: when the reservation is refused it calls
`handle_alloc_error()` and aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic. It is
not caught by `catch_unwind()`, is unaffected by `panic = "unwind"`, and is not
contained by running the call on a worker thread.</p>
<p>A 112-byte archive is sufficient. One `Stored` entry flagged `S_IFLNK` with a
ZIP64 field declaring `uncompressed_size = 2^62` and a zero-byte payload makes
`extract()` fail with:</p>
<p>```
memory allocation of 4611686018427387904 bytes failed
Aborted (core dumped)          # exit 134
```</p>
<p>The declared value only needs to exceed the host's address space, not its RAM:
`Vec::with_capacity()` maps address space without touching pages, so resident
memory stays flat and the abort happens on the refused reservation itself. Under
a `ulimit -v`…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rustsec-2026-0429"/>
  </entry>
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