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  <updated>2026-10-29T05:12:57.983110+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-106072</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-106072</title>
    <updated>2026-10-29T05:12:57.984959+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> nodejs node</p>
<p>A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname verification allows a certificate with only a DNS SAN to authenticate an IP endpoint when the client connects using a non-canonical IPv4 spelling, such as `0177.0.0.1`, `0x7f.0.0.1`, `2130706433` or `127.1`.</p>
<p>`tls.checkServerIdentity()` did not classify these hosts as IP addresses, but normalized them to their canonical form and matched the result against the certificate DNS names. A certificate containing `DNS:127.0.0.1` and no `IP Address:127.0.0.1` SAN was therefore accepted, while the same certificate is correctly rejected for `127.0.0.1`. Exploitation requires a certificate with a numeric DNS SAN issued by a CA trusted by the client, and a platform resolver that accepts these spellings, such as glibc.</p>
<p>This vulnerability affects Node.js **26.x**, **24.x**, and **22.x**.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-106072"/>
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