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  <updated>2026-11-20T21:22:12.246628+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99734</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-99734 — mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:22:12.248704+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode</p>
<p>shmem_file() only checks if file-&gt;f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().</p>
<p>So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.</p>
<p>Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.</p>
<p>Let's make shmem_file() check the inode's file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.</p>
<p>Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping-&gt;host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99734"/>
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