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  <updated>2026-11-20T21:17:28.411607+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99751</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-99751 — bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:17:28.413365+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()</p>
<p>The issue:
This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.
After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().</p>
<p>__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking
only that mac_header &lt; network_header.  Nothing verifies that the MAC
header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the
redirect goes on to read is linear either.</p>
<p>A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:</p>
<p>bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
    bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);</p>
<p>after vlan pop_eth.  The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of
linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-&gt;len &lt; skb-&gt;data_len BUG in
__skb_pull():</p>
<p>kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
    RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
    Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -&gt; packet_xmit -&gt; packet_sendmsg
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt</p>
<p>The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC
header is gone.  On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0
after the pull, so the network header sits at skb-&gt;tail and the route
lookup reads ip4h-&gt;protocol, ip4h-&gt;saddr and ip4h-&gt;daddr past the linear
area.</p>
<p>The Fix:
Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of
skb-&gt;mac_len.  mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit
pack…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99751"/>
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