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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-21T23:51:58.506419+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61442</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-61442 — PraisonAI Platform before 0.1.9 Authorization Bypass via PATCH</title>
    <updated>2026-10-21T23:51:58.509981+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p>
<p>PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 fails to enforce owner/admin authorization on the PATCH routes for projects, issues, and agents, which only require workspace-member role. A workspace member can modify owner-created records; for projects, a member can reassign lead_id to their own user id and then delete the owner-created project, bypassing the delete route's owner/admin permission check.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61442"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4262</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-4262 — PraisonAI: Platform member PATCH routes allow owner resource rewrites and project lead reassignment delete bypass</title>
    <updated>2026-10-21T23:51:58.510100+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p># Platform member PATCH routes allow owner resource rewrites and project lead reassignment delete bypass</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`praisonai-platform` lets an ordinary workspace member patch owner-created project, issue, and agent records even though the paired delete routes enforce owner/admin authorization. For projects, the member can first patch `lead_id` to their own user id and then delete the owner-created project, bypassing a delete guard that correctly returned `403` before the reassignment.</p>
<p>## Technical Details</p>
<p>The affected boundary is the difference between "is a workspace member" and "owns or administers this resource". `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/deps.py` defines `require_workspace_member`, `require_workspace_admin`, `require_workspace_owner`, and `require_delete_permission`. `require_workspace_member` only checks that the caller has at least the `member` role in the workspace, while `require_delete_permission` allows delete only for workspace admins/owners or the resource owner.</p>
<p>The project update route in `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py` defines `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` with `user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member)`. It passes `title`, `description`, `status`, `lead_type`, and `lead_id` into `ProjectService.update`. `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py` then writes `project.lead_id = lead_id` when supplied. The paired project delete rout…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4262"/>
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