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  <updated>2026-10-02T04:34:12.345561+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-59991</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-59991 — psd-tools: Uncontrolled memory allocation in psd-tools composite/numpy via crafted PSD geometry</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T04:34:12.347689+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> psd-tools</p>
<p>psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to 1.17.4, PSDImage.composite() and PSDImage.numpy() allocated output buffers from attacker-controlled PSD header geometry, including width, height, channels, depth, and per-layer rectangles, before validating those values against the available file data. A tiny crafted PSD could therefore cause multi-gigabyte memory allocation, and PSDImage.composite() could return a black image with only a warning instead of raising an exception. Services that composite untrusted PSD files could be terminated by out-of-memory handling. This issue is fixed in version 1.17.4.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-59991"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4139</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-4139 — psd-tools composite/numpy has uncontrolled memory allocation via crafted PSD geometry</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T04:34:12.347751+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: psd-tools</p>
<p>### Summary
`PSDImage.composite()` (and `.numpy()`) allocate the output image buffer from the PSD's header geometry (width × height × channels × depth, and per-layer rectangles) before validating those values against the actual file contents. A tiny crafted PSD declaring huge dimensions causes a multi-gigabyte allocation. Critically, `composite()` then returns a (black) image with only a warning, no exception is raised, so a caller cannot detect or guard against it.</p>
<p>### Impact
On psd-tools 1.17.2 (latest), default usage, a 49-byte PSD makes `composite()` commit ~3 GB and return successfully (warning only); `.numpy()` reaches ~7.5 GB, and the per-layer rectangle is a second lever (up to ~32 GB), all from an input under 100 bytes (input-to-commit amplification over 1000×). Because the buffer is committed before validation and no exception is thrown, any service that composites untrusted PSDs is exposed to denial of service: on a host with less RAM than the attacker-declared geometry the allocation is an unrecoverable OOM-kill.</p>
<p>### Steps to reproduce
```python
# pip install psd-tools==1.17.2
from psd_tools import PSDImage
psd = PSDImage.open("psd-psdtools-grammar-d23.psd")
psd.composite()   # commits ~3 GB from a 49-byte file and returns (warning only)
```</p>
<p>PoC (49 bytes), reconstruct with:
```sh
base64 -d &gt; psd-psdtools-grammar-d23.psd &lt;&lt;'EOF'
OEJQUwABAAAAAAAAAAYAACg4AAAXTAAIAAMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAUNIUIFU+yQtDw==
EOF
```
Verify:
```
7d8ebf03a54393cb0359ecf4b676d1b08c9a8c6afdd…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4139"/>
  </entry>
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