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  <updated>2026-11-20T21:23:29.160969+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99542</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-99542 — ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:23:29.163225+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request</p>
<p>smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2
CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a
security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the
function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no
access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and
WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).</p>
<p>The empty-DACL branch only denies when both</p>
<p>- the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)),
    and
  - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.</p>
<p>In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0,
which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants
the full requested access. Three problems follow:</p>
<p>- The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit
    rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those
    rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For
    READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to
    inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of
    an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.</p>
<p>- A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any
    caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.</p>
<p>- A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes
    (pdacl…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99542"/>
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