<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-17T21:07:45.529584+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://db.gcve.eu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61437</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-61437 — PraisonAI before 1.6.78 Remote Code Execution via tools.py</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T21:07:45.532088+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p>
<p>PraisonAI (pip package praisonaiagents) before 1.6.78 contains an unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability in AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class (src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py). When a workflow step uses a string output_pydantic reference, the framework locates and imports a sibling tools.py from the workflow file's directory via importlib exec_module without sandboxing, ignoring the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS environment variables. An attacker who controls a workflow file and its sibling tools.py can execute arbitrary Python code with the workflow runner's privileges when the workflow is executed via WorkflowManager or after load_yaml.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61437"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4267</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-4267 — PraisonAI: Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution via tools.py in AgentFlow</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T21:07:45.532163+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p>
<p>### Summary
An unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability allows an attacker who can control a workflow file and a sibling `tools.py` to execute arbitrary Python code when the workflow is executed.</p>
<p>### Details
The vulnerability is located in the workflow structured output resolution logic.</p>
<p>File: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py</p>
<p>Method: AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class</p>
<p>```python
if self.file_path:
    workflow_dir = Path(self.file_path).parent
    tools_path = workflow_dir / "tools.py"</p>
<p>if tools_path.exists():
        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools", tools_path)
        tools_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
        spec.loader.exec_module(tools_module)   # Arbitrary code execution
```</p>
<p>This code is reached during step execution when a step uses a string `output_pydantic`:</p>
<p>```python
step_output_pydantic = getattr(step, '_output_pydantic', None)
if step_output_pydantic and isinstance(step_output_pydantic, str):
    resolved_class = self._resolve_pydantic_class(step_output_pydantic)
```</p>
<p>`file_path` is set automatically by:
- `WorkflowManager._load_workflow()` (used by workspace discovery)
- `WorkflowManager.create_workflow()`</p>
<p>It can also be set manually after `load_yaml()`:
```python
wf = mgr.load_yaml("workflow.yaml")
wf.file_path = "workflow.yaml"
```</p>
<p>The `exec_module()` call has no sandboxing and ignores the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS` environment variables used elsewhere in the project.</p>
<p>### PoC
Cre…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4267"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
