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  <updated>2026-11-02T20:30:31.510308+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98584</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-98584 — net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()</title>
    <updated>2026-11-02T20:30:31.511980+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()</p>
<p>em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing
it.  strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into
conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised.  nla_put_nohdr()
then copies the full struct to the netlink response.</p>
<p>KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path,
one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump:</p>
<p>BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620
    nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130
    em_text_dump+0x291/0x550
  Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550
  Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized</p>
<p>I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in
practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and
the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual
production kernels.  I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a
kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward.  I can provide a
userspace reproducer on request.</p>
<p>The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size.
Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced
it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition.
Zero-initialising the struct closes it.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98584"/>
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