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  <updated>2026-10-22T21:38:57.845290+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-94140</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-94140 — Rex versions through 1.16.1 for Perl accept an unknown SSH host key for remote rsync transfers because sync hardcodes S…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-22T21:38:57.846871+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Rex</p>
<p>Rex versions through 1.16.1 for Perl accept an unknown SSH host key for remote rsync transfers because sync hardcodes StrictHostKeyChecking=no.</p>
<p>Every remote branch of sync builds its ssh command with that option, for password authentication, for private-key authentication and for the fallback. The ssh options a caller sets through set_openssh_opt reach the OpenSSH transport but not this command, so there is no configuration that restores host key checking for the transfer.</p>
<p>An attacker who can redirect the connection before the real host key is known presents their own and the transfer proceeds: under password authentication sync sends the connection password to that server, an upload writes the selected local files to it, and a download writes what it returns to the local destination.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-94140"/>
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