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  <updated>2026-11-11T12:07:17.368014+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-76877</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-76877 — WPML Multilingual CMS &lt;= 4.9.7 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass in Language-per-Domain SSO via 'wpml_sso_token_d…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-11T12:07:17.369449+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> WPML Multilingual CMS</p>
<p>The WPML Multilingual CMS plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Race Condition in versions up to, and including, 4.9.7. This is due to the `process_iframe_request` function's language-per-domain SSO handler generating the cross-domain sign-in token via `wp_create_nonce('wpml_sso')` on the logout landing page, where the browser has already discarded its authentication cookies — so `wp_get_session_token()` returns an empty string and the token collapses to the shared anonymous nonce for the current 12-hour tick rather than a user-bound secret — and then storing it in the `wpml_sso_user_&lt;token&gt;_&lt;sha256('wpml_sso'.$domain)&gt;` transient mapped to the victim's `user_id` with no binding to the specific sign-out action or requesting client. Because an unauthenticated attacker can independently derive the identical token by triggering the logout confirmation flow on `wp-login.php?action=logout`, and because the `is_iframe_request()` gate conditions (the per-domain SSO `started` transient and domain-hash derived from the public constant `SSO_NONCE`) are fully computable within the 60-second `SSO_TIMEOUT` window, an unauthenticated attacker can submit the forged `wpml_sso_token_domain` parameter with a `wpml_user_signed_in` status to a secondary language-domain endpoint before the legitimate `wpml_user_signed_out` iframe fires, causing WordPress authentication cookies to be issued for the victim. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain acce…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-76877"/>
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