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  <updated>2026-10-01T09:21:28.606845+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-62308</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-62308 — Tugtainer: Authenticated SSRF via arbitrary notification URLs in test_notification endpoint</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T09:21:28.608821+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Quenary tugtainer</p>
<p>Tugtainer is a self-hosted app for automating updates of Docker containers. Prior to version 1.30.6, Tugtainer allows an authenticated user to make the backend server send outbound HTTP requests to arbitrary user-supplied URLs through the notification test endpoint. The /settings/test_notification endpoint accepts a urls field and passes it directly to Apprise without restricting protocols, hostnames, localhost addresses, private IP ranges, or cloud metadata addresses. This can be abused as an authenticated blind server-side request forgery (SSRF). This issue has been patched in version 1.30.6.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-62308"/>
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