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  <updated>2026-11-19T19:46:11.164333+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-59975</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-59975 — SharpIppNext: Unbounded IPP Document Stream Buffering Leads to Denial of Service</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T19:46:11.165676+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> danielklecha SharpIppNext</p>
<p>SharpIppNext is a .NET Standard library for building Internet Printing Protocol clients and servers. Prior to 4.1.0, server-side SharpIppNext implementations using SharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync or SharpIppServer.ReceiveRawRequestAsync pass incoming data to IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync in SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs, where ReadDocumentStream is enabled by default and the remaining document body is copied with CopyToAsync into a MemoryStream without a size limit. An unauthenticated remote client can send an arbitrarily large IPP document body, exhausting process memory and causing an out-of-memory failure or service termination. Client-only implementations using SharpIppClient are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-59975"/>
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