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  <updated>2026-10-01T13:41:32.401880+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-46711</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-46711 — Soft Machine: Unauthenticated workspace API exposes arbitrary file read &amp; directory exfiltration to any peer on the Fly…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T13:41:32.422990+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Soft-Machine-io security</p>
<p>Soft Machine is a Virtual Machine–based agentic development environment / Cloud OS. In versions 0.2.247 and prior, the workspace HTTP service that listens on 0.0.0.0:8080 inside each sm-ws-* Fly Machine exposes endpoints (/health, /file/&lt;path&gt;, /archive/&lt;dir&gt;) without any authentication or origin check. Any host that can reach TCP/8080 on a workspace can read arbitrary files under that workspace's /workspace root and download whole project trees as tar archives. Because every workspace shares the same Fly private 6PN and resolves all peer addresses via the unauthenticated _instances.internal TXT record, every other sm-ws-* machine on the same Fly app/org is a reachable, unauthenticated attacker — the trust boundary (workspace owner ↔ everyone-else) is missing. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-46711"/>
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