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  <updated>2026-10-27T22:42:45.175129+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115693</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-115693 — Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney</title>
    <updated>2026-10-27T22:42:45.176722+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> benoitc hackney</p>
<p>Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.</p>
<p>The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.</p>
<p>This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115693"/>
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