In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: conntrack: tcp: use UNACK timeout for non-closing RST packets

Commit be0502a3f2e9 ("netfilter: conntrack: tcp: only close if RST matches exact sequence") keeps an established conntrack entry in ESTABLISHED when an in-window RST does not match the expected sequence number exactly, so the endpoint can validate the RST with a challenge ACK.

The timeout selection nevertheless uses the CLOSE timeout for every RST packet. The bug is that timeout selection is based on the packet type, not on the state transition result: even when RST validation keeps new_state in ESTABLISHED, the timeout is still forced to TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE.

Linux TCP independently rate limits challenge ACKs per socket. A second non-exact RST can therefore arrive after the first challenge ACK has restored the timeout but before the rate limit expires. The second RST lowers the timeout to 10 seconds again while the endpoint suppresses the second challenge ACK, allowing the conntrack entry to expire while both TCP endpoints remain established.

Using the ESTABLISHED timeout for such RSTs would avoid this short expiration window, but it could also retain stale entries for the five-day default because conntrack cannot reliably match the endpoint's exact TCP state.

Use the UNACK timeout for RST packets that leave the conntrack entry in TCP_CONNTRACK_ESTABLISHED. Exact-match RSTs and accepted RST packet trains still fall through to…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: conntrack: tcp: use UNACK timeout for non-closing RST packets

Commit be0502a3f2e9 ("netfilter: conntrack: tcp: only close if RST matches exact sequence") keeps an established conntrack entry in ESTABLISHED when an in-window RST does not match the expected sequence number exactly, so the endpoint can validate the RST with a challenge ACK.

The timeout selection nevertheless uses the CLOSE timeout for every RST packet. The bug is that timeout selection is based on the packet type, not on the state transition result: even when RST validation keeps new_state in ESTABLISHED, the timeout is still forced to TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE.

Linux TCP independently rate limits challenge ACKs per socket. A second non-exact RST can therefore arrive after the first challenge ACK has restored the timeout but before the rate limit expires. The second RST lowers the timeout to 10 seconds again while the endpoint suppresses the second challenge ACK, allowing the conntrack entry to expire while both TCP endpoints remain established.

Using the ESTABLISHED timeout for such RSTs would avoid this short expiration window, but it could also retain stale entries for the five-day default because conntrack cannot reliably match the endpoint's exact TCP state.

Use the UNACK timeout for RST packets that leave the conntrack entry in TCP_CONNTRACK_ESTABLISHED. Exact-match RSTs and accepted RST packet trains still fall through to…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.